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Abstract 
In response to the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia’s critical cyber infrastructure 
there have been a wealth of documents produced by Estonian government ministries and 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence that address the topic of 
cyber security. This thesis examines the concept of desecuritization within the 
Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory and the Estonian discourse on cyber conflict 
following the 2007 attacks. The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate some of the 
major public policy documents that were published by the Estonian government 
ministries and the NATO CCDCOE that address the issue of cyber conflict in order to 
assess the movement of the discourse generated by the public policy documents towards 
securitization or desecuritization. Through the methodological approach of discourse 
analysis, the documents evidenced a general trend towards securitizing movement 
throughout the examined period of 2008 to 2014. However, based on the theoretical 
conceptualization of desecuritization and its application to portions of the documents’ 
discourse, the potentiality of desecuritizing movement within Estonian cyber politics was 
evidenced. As a derivative of the findings in this thesis, a shift in the paradigm for the 
study of cyber conflict is proposed for future research. In particular, the employment of 
the desecuritization concept as a tool in which to analyze political discourse is 
emphasized as an initial step for researchers to alternatively study threat perception and 
security as it relates to cyber conflict. In addition to this, it is also proposed that the 
theorization of cyber peace building, as an associated concept to cyber desecuritization, 
be further analyzed in future research studies. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 The month-long cyber attack against Estonia’s critical cyber infrastructure during 
the spring of 2007 was a pivotal instance in which the destructive capacity of cyber 
operations against a state was evidenced for the international community. In a form of 
political protest, the attackers targeted the major websites of the Estonian government, 
some of the most widely distributed news agencies in Estonia, the biggest Estonian 
Internet service providers, and the major online banking services within Estonia. These 
attacks were carried out as a result of the movement of a memorial for fallen Soviet 
soldiers from the city center to a cemetery in the outskirts of the Estonian capital of 
Tallinn, which had the effect of angering a contingency of the Russian minority within 
the country as well as some Russians outside of Estonia. The ensuing cyber protest of this 
removal of the memorial came about in the form of various methods of cyber attack. For 
the sake of brevity, these attacks can be summated as modes of service denial for the 
Estonian networked infrastructure. 
In effect, the cyber attacks rendered major elements of the Estonian populace’s 
Internet connectivity unusable while also limiting the ability of the government and 
media to communicate with the Estonian people via the cyber medium. The scale of these 
attacks, in which the political, economic, military, and societal sectors were affected, 
prompted a movement to assess the way in which the Estonian government viewed its 
cyber security strategy, especially in terms of deterring future asymmetrical cyber attacks 
similar to what was experienced in 2007.  
 The movement to reassess the Estonian cyber security strategy began the 
following year in 2008 with the initial release of the Estonian Ministry of Defense’s 
“Cyber Security Strategy” document. Following the publication of this cyber security 
strategy document, and the concomitant creation of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence in Tallinn, both the NATO CCDCOE and the Estonian ministerial 
organs continued to publish documents aimed at addressing cyber security and putting 
forth policy recommendations with the intention of strengthening cyber conflict 
deterrence. In addition to policy recommendation documents, the Estonian Information 
Systems Authority published annual reports on the status of cyber security and peace in 
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order to track the efficacy of the implementation of the new security and policy 
directives. 
 The terminological usage of ‘security’ has varied interpretations within the field 
of international relations. One perspective that emerged in the early 1990s is the 
Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory. Whether viewed as a traditional theoretical 
perspective, or as a methodological framework, Securitization Theory’s principle purpose 
remains that it aims to serve as a tool for the analysis of politics on various levels and 
sectors, particularly the transition of an issue (cyber attacks for instance) to an extreme 
level of politics through the conveyance of existential threat to a referent object. This 
movement of an issue to a status out of the realm of the political for the purpose of 
operating outside of legislative capacity represents a securitization. Conversely, the 
movement of an issue back to the spectrum of the politicized is the process of 
desecuritization. By using this understanding of security, the researcher can thus study 
the political maneuvering of a state in regards to a certain issue.  
 Thus, by speaking in terms of security the Estonian state effectively frames the 
issue of cyber conflict in a securitized manner. However, the Estonian policy 
recommendations in their publications on the issue of cyber conflict have been largely 
aimed at alleviating threat through both non-legislative means, and through politicized 
policy initiatives that do not generally reflect a movement towards the Estonian state 
taking exceptional measures to eliminate existential threat to the state. This realization 
presents a situation wherein the discourse of these public policy documents can be 
investigated from a perspective of analyzing the prospects of a desecuritizing movement 
on the political spectrum in Estonia rather than looking to assess a movement towards the 
securitized status of the issue of cyber threat. With that being said, the proposed research 
question (and subquestion) for this thesis is as follows: 
 
What are the main elements of the discourse emanating from Estonian public policy 
documents on cyber security? And is this discourse indicative of desecuritizing moves in 
the publications following the 2007 attacks? 
 
With regards to the above research question guiding the research objective, the 
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overall thesis is designed to first cover the aforementioned Copenhagen School 
Securitization Theory as it serves as the theoretical basis of the research. In particular, the 
theoretical chapter will cover the desecuritization concept in much deeper detail than 
what is offered in this introduction section in order to better elucidate its 
conceptualization before moving forward in the analysis. A point of emphasis as to why 
desecuritization was chosen as a focus rather than desecuritization lies in the Copenhagen 
School’s authors’ explanation of desecuritization as being the ultimate concluding goal of 
securitization itself. This sentiment is explored further in the theoretical chapter. 
Subsequently, the methodology chapter will cover the overall design and implementation 
of the research. As this research study is based on the analysis of discourse, the 
understanding and application of discourse analysis is further elaborated on. In addition 
to this, the methodology chapter will cover the topics of the case study design of 
analyzing the policy documents, and the research objective going forward from what has 
been established with the presentation of the research question. Chapter 4 breaks down 
the technical side of the thesis in that it covers the inherent meaning of the term ‘critical 
cyber infrastructure’ and includes a survey of the various known modes of cyber attack 
including the ones used in the Estonian case. Chapter 5 is a move into the heart of the 
discussion and analysis of the Estonian policy documents where the culmination of the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks allow for the assessment of discourse trends 
referent to securitization and desecuritization movements in Estonian policy. Finally, 
Chapter 6 serves as a reflective discussion of the findings in Chapter 5 as well as serving 
as a platform from which recommendations for future research initiatives will be offered 
in light of the research that was done herein.  
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 2.0 Theory Chapter 
 The theoretical basis of this study is predominantly grounded in the Copenhagen 
School’s Securitization Theory. The foundation of which is primarily attributed to Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde through their various works that culminated into 
their book, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, as well as numerous publications 
since the book’s release in 1998, that have addressed criticisms of the theory and also 
added to the continued development of the theory. In addition to these primary authors of 
the Copenhagen School, I will also draw upon Lene Hansen’s work on both the concept 
of desecuritization and the application of Securitization Theory to the field of study 
pertaining to cyber security. The following chapter will cover the fundamental aspects of 
the Copenhagen School’s theory, as well as cover associated concepts of the theory for 
the purpose of providing a theoretical basis from which to base the later analytical 
sections of this study. Ultimately, the theoretical framework of this study will be applied 
towards the subject of cyber securitization, and subsequently used to examine the 
prospects of processes of cyber desecuritization within the public discourse created by the 
chosen primary documents. 
 
2.1 Securitization Theory  
As it is defined in their book, Buzan et al. explain, “’security’ is the move that 
takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a 
special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more 
extreme kind of politics or as above politics.”1 Accordingly, the securitization of a 
selected issue is a process in which the issue transcends normal political means to resolve 
the threat that the issue presents. The term ‘threat’ is paramount within Securitization 
Theory as the threat to the existentialism of a referent object is the specified reasoning 
behind the move to securitize an issue in order to make it exceptional. Buzan et al. refer 
to the act of raising an issue above normal politics in order to seek a remedy to the 
existential threat posed to a referent object as a “securitizing move.”2 In the act of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Analysis:	  1998.	  p.	  23	  2	  Ibid.	  p.	  25	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initiating a securitizing move, the securitizing actor seeks to frame the issue in a way that 
the exceptionalized status of the issue allows for the actor to addresses the threat in a 
manner that is normally carried out when addressed in the political realm within the 
confines of a legislated framework. 
 Securitizing moves are incumbent on actors in an elite status to initiate. 
Securitizing elites require an elevated level of authority over the audience in which they 
seek to convey the necessity for the securitized status of a referent object. According to 
Waever, “by definition something is a security issue when the elites declare it to be so.”3 
From this assumption, it can be said that the power possessed by the securitizing elites 
must be derived from an advanced level of epistemological, moral, and judicial authority 
that is held over the audience. Additionally, the persuasionary method of convincing the 
audience of the necessity for securitization indicates that securitization, in the most basic 
sense, operates as a speech act. Buzan et al. refer to the interconnected relationship 
between speech act and securitization in explaining that through the act of speaking 
security, the securitization of the referent object subsequently begins to take place. 
However, deference must be given to the audience’s willingness to accept the 
securitization, as securitization is not wholly defined by the speech act itself.4 
Within a study based within the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen 
School’s Securitization Theory, there is a necessity to provide a brief introduction to the 
concept of sectors, and the practice of sectoral analysis. The use of Securitization Theory 
as an analytical tool to examine the processes of securitizing speech acts moving 
specified threats to an elevated status requires a delineation of which political sector the 
securitization occurs in. Buzan et al.’s Security text offers ‘Military, Environmental, 
Economic, Societal, and Political’ as the different sectors in which securitization occurs. 
The Copenhagen School’s understanding of sectors and the referent objects within them 
has slowly expanded over time, from simply viewing the state as the referent object 
within the five previously stated sectors, towards the realization that numerous other 
referent objects are affected by securitization other than just the state.5 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Waever,	  Ole.	  Securitization	  and	  Desecuritization,	  in	  Lipschultz,	  On	  Security,	  1995.	  p.	  54	  4	  Buzan,	  Barry.	  "Rethinking	  Security	  After	  The	  Cold	  War."	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict	  32	  (1997).	  p.	  15	  5	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  8	  refers	  to	  Ole	  Waever’s	  text,	  Identity,	  Migration,	  and	  the	  new	  Security	  
Order	   in	  Europe	   (1993:	  24-­‐27)	  as	   the	   starting	  point	   from	  which	   the	  Copenhagen	  School	   altered	   its	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Securitization Theory’s sectoral aspect goes hand in hand with the levels of 
analysis that are expressed in the Security: Framework text. If Securitization Theory is to 
be understood as an analytical tool for the purpose of assessing the process of 
securitization, then it is important to examine what constitutes the specific levels of 
analysis of the theory. The purpose in doing this is to identify the different actors that can 
potentially be considered as referent objects of securitization, and thus underscore how 
the levels of analysis can be used as a way to compare the different sectors.6  
The Copenhagen School views the levels of analysis7 in their theory to include: 1. 
International systems, which is the largest possible level, due to it essentially being a 
blanket term for the trans-global systemic relationship. 2. International subsystems, or 
“groups of units within the international system by the particular nature or intensity of 
their interactions with or interdependence of each other”, and can be regionally, 
economically or ideologically based in terms of the reasoning for their establishment. 3. 
Units, “meaning actors composed of various subgroups organizations, communities, and 
many individuals and sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from 
others and to have standing at the higher levels.” Buzan et al. exemplify the term ‘units’ 
as, “states, nations, [and] transnational firms.” 4. Subunits, which refers to “organized 
groups of individuals within units that are able to affect the behavior of the unit. 4. 
Individuals, which is the smallest level of analysis in the theory.8 Later, in the exercise of 
applying Securitization Theory to the specific focus of this study, cyber securitization and 
desecuritization, it will be exceedingly important to draw a connection between the 
different levels of analysis and the extent to which cyber securitization permeates these 
objects.  
“Classical Security Complex Theory” is closely linked with the sectoral analysis 
aspect of the Copenhagen School’s theory. This theory was first presented by Buzan in 
his book, People, States, and Fear (1983) and further developed in other Copenhagen 
School publications including the Security: Framework text. The definitive explanation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  original	  conception	  of	  sectors	  to	  become	  a	  multisectoral	  approach	  that	  includes	  multifarious	  referent	  objects.	  6	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  164	  7	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  5	  clarify	  the	  term	  “levels	  of	  analysis”	  to	  mean	  “objects	  of	  analysis	  that	  are	  defined	  by	  a	  range	  of	  spatial	  scales,	  from	  small	  to	  large.”	  8	  Ibid.	  p.	  5-­‐6.	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of this theory is explained by Buzan et al. as “a set of units whose major processes of 
securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems 
cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”9 The benefit of the 
security complex concept, as Buzan et al. explain, is that it “posits the existence of 
regional subsystems as the objects of security analysis and offers and analytical 
framework for dealing with those systems” as well as serving as a reasoning to 
underscore the importance of the regional level in the context of global security 
analysis.10 Additionally, it is important to further emphasize the author’s definition of 
security complexes noting that rather than viewing the state’s securitizing actions within 
the security complex as directly affecting the dynamics of the security complex, it is, in 
actuality the units within the state that shape the complex through their securitizing 
actions.11 Though Security Complex Theory ultimately plays a relatively small part 
within the necessary overall framework for this particular research study, it is relevant in 
the sense that it serves as a foundation from which other more relevant concepts of 
Securitization Theory will be applied to cyber securitization. In particular, this theory will 
be beneficial in introducing the related Securitization Theory concepts of 
‘Macrosecuritization’ and ‘Security Constellations’, as well as their connection to cyber 
security. 
The Copenhagen School’s description of securitizing a particular threat / issue as 
a speech act is further expounded upon, as well as critiqued for the purpose of 
reconceptualization, by Thierry Balzacq in his article The Three Faces of Securitization: 
Political Agency, Audience, and Context. Balzacq holds a contention with the basic 
normative assumptions of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde that the securitizing speech act 
operates as a static “code of practice”12 in which the securitizing actor and the audience 
of the speech act are bound to a mutually reciprocal understanding of the necessity to 
securitize an issue. Balzacq describes the Copenhagen School’s assumption as a 
conventional procedure wherein the conditions for success, or “felicity circumstances” as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.	  p.	  201	  10	  Ibid.	  p.	  11	  11	  Ibid.	  p.	  200	  12	  Balzacq, Thierry. "The Three Faces Of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience And Context." 
European Journal of International Relations 11 (2005). p.	  172	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they are described in the text, “must fully prevail for the act to go through.”13 Rather than 
understanding the speech act in this manner, Balzacq offers a new conceptualization in 
which the speech act is viewed as a “strategic (pragmatic)” practice that is ensconced 
within a dynamic relationship of persuasion between the securitizing actor and the 
audience. More specifically, Balzacq maintains that the “audience, political agency, and 
context” are three incredibly important factors that weigh in on the success of a 
securitizing speech act that have been generally overlooked by the members of the 
Copenhagen School. 
In terms of the specific nature of the speech act referred to in Securitization 
Theory, Balzacq points to John Austin’s Speech Act Theory as the foundation from 
which Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde base their understanding of the speech act as it is 
presented in their theory. From Austin’s theory, Balzacq offers three types of 
performative speech acts, “ (i) locutionary – the utterance of an expression that contains a 
given sense and reference; (ii) illocutionary – the act performed in articulating a locution 
… and (iii) perlocutionary, which is ‘consequential effects’ or ‘sequels’ that are aimed at 
evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience.”14 Consequently, 
Balzacq draws a parallel between Austin’s theory and the Habermas’ Theory of 
Communication Action (1985) in which “to say something, to act in saying something, to 
bring about something through acting in saying something” are referred to as summated 
expressions of the aforementioned speech acts. Thus, the amalgamation of these acts into 
a singular concept constitutes the pragmatic action that Balzacq refers to as being 
differentiated from the speech act that’s was presented by Buzan et al. in Security: 
Framework. 
In effect, securitizing speech acts are massively influenced by multiple factors 
surrounding the instances of persuasion between the securitizing actor and the audience.  
The perlocutionary act is dependent on the linguistic capacity of the actor to elucidate the 
necessitation to securitize a threat for the audience. Therefore, as explained by Balzacq, 
the success of a securitizing move by a particular actor is reliant on three basic 
assumptions: 1. The move is “context-dependent”; 2.  There must be a high degree of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	  p.	  172	  14	  Ibid.	  p.	  175	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specificity towards the target audience of the securitization; 3. “Securitization dynamics 
are power-laden” between the securitizing elite and the audience they are trying to 
convince of the imminent threat.15 
 
2.2 Desecuritization  
Ole Waever’s Securitization and Desecuritization article, similarly to Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis, is a text that is essential to the foundational understanding 
of Securitization Theory. Waever’s text answers the question of what the threshold for 
determining whether an issue has been securitized is. Waever explains that securitization 
is essentially a “speech act”, and as such, the mere utterance of “security”, and its 
inherent implication for the necessity to remedy a threatening security issue, constitutes 
the threshold whereby it gains a securitized extra-political status.16 Though the 
securitization act can be carried out on as small of a scale as amongst individuals, for 
instance, Waever commonly refers to “elites” as the actors that are responsible for 
initiating the securitization of a particular issue. Waever explains that the extra-political 
status always accompanies the securitization of an issue / security problem due to the 
state and the main power holders within the state’s natural inclination to use all means 
within the possessed power to eliminate existential threats to the state before any other 
less threatening issue can be addressed.  
Additionally, Waever makes a point in his text to dispel the notion that security 
and insecurity have a binary relationship where there can only be one or the other. 
Insecurity, according to Waever, is still a situation where existential threat has been 
established, but no response has been initiated to counteract the threat.17 Desecuritization 
is the aspect of the theory that represents the binary alternative to securitization. As the 
alternative to securitization, desecuritization is the process that removes an issue from the 
position of being transcendent of the sphere of political discourse to alleviate the threat 
posed to the referent object.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ibid.	  p.	  179	  16	  Waever,	  Ole.	  Securitization	  and	  Desecuritization,	  in	  Lipschultz,	  On	  Security:	  1995.	  p.	  55	  17	  Ibid.	  p.	  56	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The term “desecuritization” is rarely used in Weaver’s article as he opts to use 
“détente” as an exemplary term to describe desecuritization. Waever accomplishes this by 
examining the dynamics within the East-West dialogue during the later stages of the Cold 
War, particularly the efforts made by “détente-orientated” Western actors towards 
guiding the Eastern actors in the avoidance of securitizing issues that they felt to be 
threatening.18 The Western actors’ push for the Eastern elites to shift “threats into 
challenges and security into politics” evidences the way in which détente-orientated 
dialogue represents the process of desecuritizing issues so as to remove them from the 
speech-act-induced transcendent position above political discourse.19 Waever’s text is far 
more instrumental in terms of explicitly determining the foundational theoretical 
understanding of the desecuritization concept than Buzan et al.’s Framework text. 
However, Waever’s Securitization and Desecuritization falls short in offering a detailed 
explanation of the application of desecuritization with respect to the multifarious issues 
that have or could become securitized by actors whom have a stake in the existentialism 
of a particular referent object.  The task of applying Waever’s conceptual framework for 
desecuritization towards the broadened field of potential referent objects within security 
studies falls upon other academics, both within and outside of the Copenhagen School, to 
articulate the nature and dimensions of desecuritization. 
Lene Hansen’s Reconstructing desecuritization: the normative-political in the 
Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it is perhaps the best and most up to 
date consolidation and analysis of the essential works that have been done on the topic of 
securitization and desecuritization. Hansen draws from the conceptualization of 
desecuritization as it is originally presented by Waever, as well as from the subsequent 
critiques emanating from academics outside of the Copenhagen School in order to assess 
the current standing of both the shortcomings and applicability of this theoretical concept. 
One of Hansen’s initial tasks in her analysis is to reference the critical evaluation that the 
Copenhagen School lacks any “normative connotations due to its repudiation of the 
concept of emancipation.”20 Hansen cites Rita Taurek’s critique of Securitization and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Ibid.	  p.	  60	  19	  Ibid.	  p.	  60	  20	  Hansen,	  Lene.	  "Reconstructing	  Desecuritisation:	  The	  Normative-­‐political	  in	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  and	  Directions	  for	  How	  to	  Apply	  It."	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  38,	  no.	  3	  (2012).	  p.	  527	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Desecuritization in which she criticizes the lack of initial theorization leaving “the door 
wide open for interpretation”, as well as Taurek’s claim that desecuritization can be seen 
as an “emancipatory ideal” because of its nature as being a process in which an issue is 
freed from its securitized status as an existential threat as the two largest gaps in the 
theorization of desecuritization.21 
Hansen’s second point of emphasis is to highlight the diverse pool of influences 
on both the primary Copenhagen theorists and the critical theorists outside of the school 
in their interpretation of the theory. Hansen notes that Buzan et al. have not been 
particularly explicit in their definitive position on the understanding of politics, but cites 
their brief admission of being “a middle ground” of numerous theorists that include, 
“Arendt and David Easton, Schmitt and Habermas, and Max Weber and Ernesto 
Laclau.”22 Despite listing these influences, the lack of an explicit discussion of the 
epistemological basis for the political as it is understood in the theory, is a serious 
indictment of the original theorists. 
 Hansen also spends a significant amount of time in her article articulating the 
foundational understanding of the desecuritization concept as presented by Waever and 
other academics in their application of the concept to other fields of study (gender, 
identity, & migration) in order to further develop the concept beyond the superficial 
presentation originally offered by Waever. Hansen explains that desecuritization is reliant 
on the fluctuation of identities, specifically a change in the “friend-enemy” dynamic 
wherein there is an existence of oppositional identification.23 In this explanation, Hansen 
references the east vs. west Cold War dynamic used by Waever in Securitization and 
Desecuritization in order to express the necessitation of process of transforming or 
destroying the attribution of a threatening enemy towards the “Other” to facilitate a 
cessation of security inducing speech acts.24  
 Finally, Hansen completes her analysis by listing four political forms of 
desecuritization in what can be seen as an attempt to expand the ability of the researcher 
to more accurately discern between the varied ways in which desecurtization takes place. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Taureck, Rita. "Securitization Theory And Securitization Studies." Journal of International Relations 
and Development 9 (2006). p.	  57	  22	  Hansen.	  "Reconstructing	  Desecuritisation”:	  2012.	  p.	  527	  23	  Ibid.	  p.	  533	  24	  Ibid.	  p.	  533	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Hansen’s legitimization for doing this is that there are no particular instances in which the 
process of desecuritization aligns with all four of the categories, and thus can be used as 
analytical tool to presuppose a theoretical articulation of the trajectory of a selected 
conflict. The first of these four political forms is “Change through stabilization.” This 
form of desecuritization is most closely associated with the détente concept as originally 
explained by Waever in his Securitization and Desecuritization article. The major 
critique of this manifestation of desecuritization that is offered by Hansen is the 
“conservative, system building character” it exhibits.25 In addition to this, change through 
stabilization generally operates on the macro scale and fails to address the security issues 
on the micro scale, as exemplified by the case of attempted stabilization in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with the intervening actors leaving local actors to take up the responsibility 
to maintain small-scale security.26  
The second political form of desecuritization, “Replacement” is simply defined 
as, “the combination of one issue moving out of security while another is simultaneously 
securitized.”27 As explained by Hansen, replacement desecuritization occurs as a result of 
the persistently changing state identities as well as power dynamics both locally and 
abroad. Through the process of change and replacement, potentially securitized threats 
are replaced by threats relevant to the new dynamic. As a result of this progressive 
change, a securitized threat will fall out of security discourse and effectively become 
desecuritized in place of a new threat that concomitantly becomes securitized in its place. 
Replacement desecuritization, however, carries about an implication in which there are 
threats within the same categorization (e.g. different ‘enemy’ states) periodically 
replacing one another’s statuses of securitized and desecuritized. This points to the 
necessity for a close evaluation of whether political dynamics related to ‘replacement 
desecuritization’ are based in a normative inclination of the state to require an “other”28 
for the maintenance of a figurative vacuum of desecuritization / securitization. 
Hansen’s third form of desecuritization is “Rearticulation.” Hansen explains that 
rearticulated desecuritizations are defined as a direct action in which “an issue from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.	  p.	  540	  26	  Ibid.	  p.	  540	  27	  Ibid.	  p.	  541	  28	  Ibid.	  p.	  541	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securitised by actively offering a political solution to the threats, dangers, and grievances 
in question.”29 Rearticulation of an issue for the purpose of bringing it back into the realm 
of political discourse has a much greater positive connotation than the prior two forms of 
desecuritization because it is not naturally followed by an eminent securitization of a new 
threat as a result of the initial desecuritization. In spite of this generally positive 
connotation for this manifestation of desecuritization, it is important to note that it has the 
appearance of offering finality to the conflict and securitization surrounding an issue, but 
in reality Rearticulation does not inherently prevent a threat from reappearing and 
subsequently becoming re-securitized.30 
The fourth and final type of desecuritzation introduced in the Hansen article is 
“Silencing.” Hansen defines Silencing as “when an issue disappears or fails to register in 
security discourse.”31 Viewing Silencing as an actual form of desecuritization is 
extremely problematic when keeping in mind that the Copenhagen School views 
desecuritization as the desirable result within the overall theory, as well as being a move 
from the special status of the securitized issue down into a state within the realm of 
political discourse. The reason why this type of desecuritization is so problematic is 
because Silencing actually removes the issue completely out of the proverbial 
securitization spectrum.32 In this regard, it is clear that understanding Silencing as a 
certain form of desecuritization is quite difficult. Though the issue, once silenced, has 
technically become desecuritized in the sense that it is no longer in a securitized status, it 
is still problematic when juxtaposed with the way in which the Copenhagen School views 
the nature of desecuritization. As such, this form of desecuritization must be approached 
cautiously when used by a researcher as a tool for the analysis of the desecuritization of a 
particular threat. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.	  p.	  542	  30	  Ibid.	  p.	  544	  31	  Ibid.	  P.	  542	  32	   An	   important	   point	   of	   reference	   for	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum	   that	   securitization	  operates	  on	  is	  Jef	  Huysmans’	  article,	  The	  Question	  of	  the	  Limit:	  Desecuritization	  and	  the	  Aesthetics	  of	  Horror	   in	  Political	  Realism,	   Journal	  of	   international	   Studies	   (1998).	  Huysmans	   rejects	   the	  notion	  of	  securitization	   being	   “the	   extreme	   form	   of	   politicization	   on	   the	   continuum	   of	   non-­‐politicised,	  politicised,	  securitized”	  (p.	  580).	  Huysmans	  believes	  that	  the	  act	  of	  securitization	  cannot	  be	  located	  within	   the	   continuum	   at	   all	   as	   Buzan	   et	   al	   understand	   it	   due	   to	   Huysmans’	   view	   of	   securitization	  being	  a	  practice	  aimed	  at	  destroying	  the	  conventional	  political	  process	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  process	  of	  transcending	  the	  point	  of	  politicization.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	   this	  study,	  however,	  securitization	  will	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  Copenhagen	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  as	  operating	  on	  the	  spectrum	  of	  politicization.	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One of the particularly difficult gaps in the current theorization regarding the 
concept of desecuritization is the possibility for the target audience to not accept a move 
out of the securitized and back to the political realm. There are many instances of 
literature covering the topic of the possibility of a securitizing move failing because the 
audience chooses not to accept the elite’s attempted conveyance of the necessity to 
protect a referent object from existential threat.33 The converse instance of audience non-
reciprocity of desecuritization, however, has yet to have any traction within the field of 
security discourse. The way in which authors like Waever and Hansen present the 
concept of desecuritization inherently implies that unlike securitizing moves, 
desecuritizing moves are normative in their nature for the audience to reciprocate the 
feelings expressed by the desecuritizing actor. This contention with the theory will be 
explored further in the analytical section of this study as the strengths and weaknesses of 
the previously mentioned modes of desecuritization are assessed in comparison to their 
potential application cyber security discourse. 
 
2.3 Aspects of Cyber Securitization 
Another point of emphasis in regards to who may securitize a specific issue out of 
the political realm, is the distinction that Securitization Theory does not only refer to 
macro-scale, state-centric moves to securitize through threat establishment. The speech 
act wherein a referent object becomes securitized can similarly be committed on a 
smaller individual scale, though this assertion is weakly expounded upon. The authors 
explain that the “size and significance” issue of securitization can be illustrated in an 
instance where the Pentagon designates “hackers as a catastrophic threat and a serious 
threat to national security, which could possibly lead to actions within the computer field 
but with no cascading effects on other security issues.”34 In exemplifying this notion, 
Buzan et al. reveal a shortcoming in their ability to assess the effects that nefarious cyber 
activity can have on multifarious security issues. The extent at which the “cascading” 
effect towards other security issues was severely underestimated in light of how the 
securitization discourse around cyber conflict has moved into sectors beyond just the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  See	  Hansen:	  2012,	  Balzacq:	  2005,	  Huysmans:	  1998.	  34	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  25	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computer field (military & societal sectors must be taken into consideration when 
discussing cyber securitization). 
The constitutional makeup of cyber security has been previously theorized by 
Ronald Deibert as consisting of four separate discourses (National Security, State 
Security, Private Security, and Network Security).35 Deibert’s first security discourse, 
National Security, refers to the state’s perceived threat to national collective identities 
emanating from the undermining effect created from the inter cultural exchange 
facilitated by internet access.36 A state’s predilection for assessing internet access as a 
threat to national cultural identity is largely incumbent on a regime’s socio-political and 
socio-economic stances. Deibert cites authoritarian and conservative regimes as having 
more inclination towards censorship of outside influence in order to preserve the integrity 
of their constituent’s collective identity, whereas liberal democratic regimes opt for either 
a “cultural alliance” approach for the sake of trade promotion, or through an approach in 
which collective identity degradation is circumnavigated by the state insistence on the 
creation of a larger domestic presence in digital media and communications in lieu of 
outright censoring the outside influence.37 
The term, State Security, is a relatively complex umbrella heading that refers to 
the external and internal threats to a state’s functional integrity. In the context of this 
study, the internet is inherently seen as a new avenue by which the government envisions 
itself as being able to conduct military activities. In actively acknowledging that the 
internet represents a mode of military attack, the state intrinsically acknowledges the 
possibility that another state or non-state actor would conduct its own military-related 
operations against them via the internet. This acknowledgement of external threat creates 
a self-reinforcing securitization process as the movement towards the exploitation of 
global network instability is further pursued. Consequently, the movement towards 
alleviating network vulnerability through methods such as encryption further confuscates 
the origin of exploitative actions, thus undermining the ability of the state to effectively 
govern both internally and externally.38 State fears over controlling the flow of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Deibert,	  Circuits	  of	  Power:	  In	  Information	  Technologies	  and	  Global	  Politics,	  Rosenau.	  2002.	  36	  Ibid.	  p.	  120	  37	  Ibid.	  p.	  121	  38	  Ibid.	  p.	  123	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information closely links state security discourse with national security discourse, 
however the key difference being the emphasis on cultural dynamic control in the 
national security context, and governance dynamic control in the state security context. 
Private security discourse is representative of the micro end of the cyber security 
scale of analysis. The level of integration of an individual’s personal data continues to 
expand as commercial and governmental services expand and require such information. 
As such, every individual is continuously developing their personal data profile with 
every digital interaction they commit. The development of this profile is also done both 
on a voluntary basis of interaction as well as through a non-voluntary interaction in the 
form of surveillance. As a result of the continuous proliferation of personal data from 
online interaction, privacy has the potential to fall into the realm of securitizing discourse 
rather than a political discourse depending on the extent of the threat towards individual-
related referent objects that is conveyed by the securitizing actor. An example of 
contemporary securitization of this sector can be seen in the claims that governmental 
surveillance and proliferation of personal data is representative of an existential threat to 
the right to privacy by the constituency.  
The term ‘networked’ is a vital descriptive in cyber security discourse that is 
referent to the structural relationships that permeate all sectors of analysis. Networked 
infrastructure, for instance, is integral within global financial institutions, military organs, 
and critical civic works. Thus, the network itself represents the fourth referent object 
within cyber security discourse as the operational integrity of the network structure 
within the various sectors is necessitated for the facilitation of the information flow 
between users and providers. Deibert explains that the securitization of network integrity 
can be seen in the incorporation of  “firewalls, virus protection software, logging and 
real-time alarm systems, and various forms of encryption” as a reactionary move that has 
resulted from increasing network attacks and breaches.39 
Similarly to the work done by Deibert, Lene Hansen’s article Digital Disaster, 
Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School, co-written with Helen Nissenbaum, serves 
as reference point for the application of Securitization Theory to the case of cyber 
conflict, as well as specifically referencing the desecuritization aspect of the theory in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.	  p.	  129	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relation to cyber conflict. One of the first important points made by Hansen and 
Nissenbaum is delineating what is meant by the term “cyber security.” As mentioned 
before, the allusion made by Buzan et al. to responsive actions being made within the 
computer field as a result of “hackers” and threats to national security may have been 
short sighted, but it also begs the question of ‘what is computer security?’ and how does 
this concept differ from the term cyber security. Hansen and Nissenbaum approach this 
problematic by elucidating the fact that the use of the term security in relation to 
computer security is not theoretically compatible with the Copenhagen School.40 This is 
because computer security discourse is technical in nature and more focused on altering 
technical systemic flaws that lead to unintended uses of various computer based 
technologies. In this sense, computer security fails to register on the politicized spectrum, 
as would be the case for a Copenhagen School understanding of the term. Consequently, 
Hansen and Nissenbaum postulate that there is a connection between computer security 
and cyber security in that the “technical discourse is linked to the securitizing discourse” 
and ultimately the term “ ‘Cyber Security’ can, in short, be seen as ‘computer security’ 
plus ‘securitization,’ “ in the Copenhagen School’s sense of the term ‘securitization.’41 
Hansen and Nissenbaum next explain how the securitizing speech act can be 
carried out in relation to cyber securitization. The authors point to the role of 
“technification” in legitimizing securitizing actions as a proactive process that capitalizes 
on the technical ignorance of the general public whom subsequently accept the necessity 
to securitize the issue conveyed by the securitizing elites. The authors refer to this 
privilege held by the securitizing elites as an “epistemic authority” held over the public.42 
The epistemic authority held by the securitizing elites asserts that the audience of the 
securitizing speech act is far more likely to accept the securitization of cyber threat 
because the audience’s lack of held knowledge relating to the cyber field prevents them 
from objecting to the securitizing act. 
Audience acceptance of cyber securitization is not, however, always derived from 
an imposed epistemic authority of securitizing elites. The lexicon associated specifically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Hansen, Lene & Nissenbaum, Helen. “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School” 
International Studies Quarterly, 53: (2009).	  p.	  1160	  41	  Ibid.	  p.	  1160	  42	  Ibid.	  p.	  1167	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with cyber securitization is an important factor in initiating the process of accepted 
securitization, as its terminology (technical and metaphorical) directly influences whether 
or not the issue of cyber conflict is perceived as an existential threat to the various 
referent objects it affects. Cyber security discourse is riddled with grammatical ploys to 
convey the necessity to give emergency status to securitizing elites to circumvent cyber-
based threats. The number of cases in which major instances of cyber conflict have 
occurred is both small and entirely up for debate, and because of this, cyber security 
discussants have largely relied upon the use of historical analogies to exemplify the 
possible outcomes emanating from cyber threat. Two often cited examples of historical 
analogies used in cyber security discourse are the terms, “electronic Pearl Harbor”43 and 
labeling a cyber attack as “the Hiroshima of cyber-war.”44  
Though the nebulousness of cyber security discourse cannot be alleviated without 
concrete exemplifications of the extent of damage done by previous cyber attacks, there 
is still much work that can be done towards better identifying the referent objects of 
cyber securitization. As mentioned when discussing the Buzan et al. Security: 
Framework text, the Copenhagen theorists failed to estimate the breadth of the cascading 
effects that cyber securitization potentially has in other sectors covered by the 
securitization umbrella, including military, economic, political, and societal. This gap in 
foresight by the Copenhagen School’s theorization is a great starting point to introduce 
the debate over what constitutes the referent object of cyber securitization, as without 
such a discussion, it is impossible to establish what object(s) potentially face existential 
threat, and thus warrant securitization.  
 
2.4 Security Constellations & Macrosecuritization 
A major point of discussion that is essential within the developing field of cyber 
securitization research is the necessity for developing an understanding of ‘cyber’s’ place 
within securitization. Specifically, this is in terms of distinguishing whether the research 
is being done with the belief that cyber security is a distinct sector on its own, similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43Bendrath,	  Ralf	  ”The	  American	  Cyber-­‐Angst	  and	  the	  Real	  World	  –	  Any	  Link?”.	  In	  Robert	  Latham	  (Ed.):	  Bombs	  and	  Bandwidth:	  The	  Emerging	  Relationship	  between	  IT	  and	  Security,	  New	  York:	  The	  New	  Press:	  2003.	  p.	  50	  44	  Rid, Thomas. "Cyber War Will Not Take Place." Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012). p. 6	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the established sectors presented by the Copenhagen School. Or if ‘cyber’ is not a sector 
in its own right and, rather, the cascading effects of cyber security simultaneously 
permeate the various sectors that are currently analyzed in the field of Security Studies. 
This problematic sets the stage for the introduction of Buzan and Waever’s added facets 
of Securitization Theory, Security Constellations and Macrosecuritization. Through the 
application of these two elements of Securitization Theory, the theoretical structure of 
cyber security stands to gain a significantly higher degree of coherence. 
The term ‘Macrosecuritization’ was born out of the criticism of the Copenhagen 
School for failing to conceptualize security on a more expanded scale, which stems from 
securitization having the primary focus of the state as the referent object of securitization. 
This, as Buzan refers to it, is “middle-scale” focused securitization.45 At polar ends of the 
referent object spectrum exist microsecuritization and macrosecuritization. 
Microsecuritization, being the end of the scale that represents individuals or small groups 
as the referent objects, is generally understood to be unsuccessful in securitizations 
because its size drastically limits the level of legitimacy that it can forge for a 
securitization to take place.46 On the other end of the spectrum, macrosecuritization 
represents the ‘international systems’ dimension of Securitization Theory’s levels of 
analysis. This means that macrosecuritization has had the connotation that its referent 
object is humanity as a whole, with contemporary attempts to frame environmental 
security as a humanity-wide threat as an example of macrosecuritization by Buzan and 
Waever.47 Despite the difference in scale, micro and macrosecuritizations are similar in 
that macrosecuritization also generally fails to gain enough legitimization to have a 
consistent level of audience acceptance. The reasoning behind this is because middle 
level securitizations possess a “we” dynamic as a result of “self-reinforcing rivalries with 
other limited collectives” and thus “create a consistently more durable scenario for 
securitization.”48 
The caveat to the previous assessment of referent object scale and success is that 
when keeping the levels of analysis in mind, there are additional levels of referent objects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. "Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitization Theory." Review of International Studies 35, no. 2 (2009). p.	  255	  46	  Buzan	  &	  Waever.	  "Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations”:	  2009.	  p.	  255	  47	  Ibid.	  p.	  255	  48	  Ibid.	  p.	  255	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in existence than what is simply covered by the macro – middle – micro scale continuum. 
In particular, the ‘international subsystem’ level of analysis is a space of operation in 
which securitization can take place between middle-scale and macro-scale. In essence, 
the securitizations created on the part of entities within the international subsystem level 
of analysis can theoretically develop into the competitive securitizations and subsequent 
‘we’ dynamic that Buzan and Waever feel is necessary for sustainable legitimacy to be 
achieved. Under this line of reasoning macrosecuritization becomes more viable and 
significantly more likely to be seen as legitimate once enacted on the international 
subsystem level.  
Discussing the nature and efficacy of the macrosecuritization concept inherently 
provokes a subsequent discussion of the concept, ‘security constellations.’ The term 
security constellations originally appears in Buzan et al.’s Security: Framework text49 
wherein the authors attempt to explain a concept in which multiple securitizations are 
interconnected amongst various levels of analysis. Similar to the classical ‘security 
complexes’ concept that was explained in the section of this chapter covering sectoral 
analysis, the security constellations concept is an analytical tool with the purpose of 
highlighting the relationships of securitizations within different sectors and levels of scale 
with a specific emphasis on the international subsystem as a level of analysis with a 
direct effect on the international scale. The difference between security complexes and 
security constellations is the overall extent and scale at which the two can be used to 
analyze large scale interconnected securitizations. While the theory of security complexes 
runs under the understanding that there are four different tiers of interaction within the 
security complex,50 the framework for security constellations transcends the regional 
focus to expand the lens for the analysis of an amalgamated dynamic relationship 
between all security-related levels of analysis as well as the intermingling of 
securitizations in the military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sectors in 
relation to a particular issue.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  168-­‐170,	  201-­‐202	  50	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Explain	  in	  Security:	  A	  New	  Framework	  For	  Analysis	  that	  the	  tiers	  of	  interaction	  within	  the	  security	  complex	  are	  either	  ”within	  states	  (focusing	  especialy	  within	  weak	  states),	  between	  states	  (linking	  them	  into	  regional	  complexes),	  between	  complexes	  (a	  minor	  or	  residual	  category	  concept	  in	  places	  where	  the	  boundaries	  between	  complexes	  were	  unstable),	  and	  between	  great	  powers	  (defining	  the	  system	  level	  or,	  in	  neorealist	  terms,	  the	  polarity	  of	  the	  system.”	  p.	  201	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The connection between macrosecuritizations and security constellations is 
evident in the assertion that the macrosecuritizations, themselves, are responsible for the 
creation of a security constellation.51 In the case of securitizations occurring on the 
international subsystem level of analysis, concomitantly competing securitizations 
construct one integrated constellation. The catalysts for competing securitizations on the 
macro scale and the consequential formulation of constellations are attributed to the 
permeation of ideological universalisms amongst the securitizing actors. Buzan and 
Waever refer to the existence of universalisms in instances of macrosecuritization as a 
signifier of the creation of security constellations. Universalisms manifest themselves in 
four different forms: Inclusive Universalisms, Exclusive Universalisms, Existing Order 
Universalisms, and Physical Threat Universalisms.52 The following text is a description 
of the four different manifestations of universalisms originally taken from Buzan and 
Waever’s Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations article. 
1. Inclusive Universalisms: ideological beliefs, whether secular or religious, about the best 
way to optimize the human condition. These are universalist in the sense that they claim 
to be directly and immediately available to all of humankind (for example, Liberalism, 
Marxism, Christianity, Islam). 
2. Exclusive Universalisms: ideological beliefs that claim superior rights and status for one 
group over the rest of humankind (for example, Marxism, white supremacy, European 
imperial doctrines; Japanese imperial doctrines). These are universalist in the sense that 
they claim the right of one group to rule over, or even replace, all of humankind. 
3. Existing Order Universalisms: political claims about threats to one or more of the 
institutions of international society, which are universalist in the sense that they take the 
global level international social structure as their referent object. Such claims could 
overlap with (1) if one universalist ideology had provided the framework for international 
society, as for example liberalism has done for the current global economy. But existing 
order universalisms could be independent, where for example in a pluralist international 
society claims were made that sovereignty was being threatened by transnational actors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Buzan	  &	  Waever.	  "Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations”:	  2009.	  p.	  259	  52	  Ibid.	  p.	  260-­‐261	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4. Physical Threat Universalisms: claims about dangers that threaten humankind on a 
planetary scale (for example, nuclear weapons, global warming, new diseases). These are 
universalist because they take the physical fate of humankind as their referent object.53 
 
For the purpose of this study, a vital connection that needs to be made is the link 
between macrosecuritization, security constellations, universalisms and the specific 
nature of cyber securitization. Keeping Deibert’s understanding of cyber securitization in 
mind, the separate discourses of cyber securitization that operate at varied levels of scale 
are closely representative of a framework for macrosecuritization, especially in the case 
of national, state, and network security being the referent objects of cyber threat. 
Consequently, the designation of cyber securitization as a partial representation54 of a 
macrosecuritization begs the question of whether the various referent objects across 
different levels of scale indicate the existence of a security constellation, or whether the 
field of cyber security discourse operates under the understanding that the referent objects 
of cyber securitization are separate as Deibert presents them. In the case of this study, an 
allegiance will be held with Hansen and Nissenbaum’s claim that cyber securitization’s 
various referent objects are in fact a part of a complex security constellation that was 
born out of competing articulations at different levels of analysis in the field.55 Thus, 
cyber security will be understood as its own separate sector with permeations of referent 
objects traditionally associated with the initial sectors of analysis espoused by the 
Copenhagen School. 
When it comes to making a connection between the universalisms concept raised 
by Buzan, and Waever and the dynamics of the cyber framework, there are two of the 
four manifestations of universalism that resonate within this framework. Existing Order 
universalisms are representative of the current dynamic standing of cyber security in that 
the general political perception of cyber threat against existing social institutions and 
state sovereignty are threatened by global nature of cyber attack eminence. Cyber 
security also exemplifies Buzan and Waever’s Physical Threat Universalism. Though this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Buzan	  &	  Waever.	  "Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations”:	  2009.	  p.	  260-­‐261	  54	  The	  inclusion	  of	  ”private	  security”	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  cyber	  securitiztion	  as	  it	  was	  presented	  by	   Deibert’s	   text,	   removes	   the	   discourse	   from	   a	   wholly	   macro	   focus,	   and	   leaves	   the	   scale	   of	  securitization	  to	  be	  reliant	  on	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  threat	  by	  the	  securitizing	  actor.	  55	  Hansen	  &	  Nissenbaum.	  ”Digital	  Disaster”:	  2009.	  p.	  1163	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assumption is still partially theoretical, the case of the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia 
gives it significantly more credence due to the potentiality for cyber attacks to 
specifically target critical state and emergency infrastructure, which has a subsequent 
direct effect on the human security of a targeted state. This threat becomes universal with 
the continued global reliance by state citizenry on these vulnerable networks. 
 To summate the overall assessment of the Copenhagen School’s Securitization 
Theory expressed in this chapter, the main points of emphasis will be highlighted again in 
preparation for their application within the analytical portion of this thesis in chapter 5. 
The act of securitization has been defined as a deliberate expression of existential threat 
towards a referent object by a securitizing elite for the purpose of moving an issue out of 
the political spectrum, and in doing so, the securitizing actor(s) seek to address the issue 
through exceptional measures beyond what is expressed in non securitized politics. As 
such, the concept of desecuritization works conversely to securitization as the ultimate 
end-goal of the securitization process and moves an issue from its exceptional status back 
to the political realm.  
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3.0 Introduction to Methodology 
 As the theoretical framework that this research study is based in has been 
thoroughly established in the previous chapter, it is logical to move to a discussion of the 
methodological framework that will be employed. As a first point of emphasis, it must be 
established that this research study is done through a solely qualitative methodological 
approach. This is not to say that there is no place for the use of statistical analysis as a 
basis for studies focused on cyber conflict, but as the intention of this research study is to 
delve into emerging theoretical conceptualizations relating to the discourse on cyber 
desecuritization, it makes the most sense to base the study in a qualitative approach as a 
means to achieve the desired end. It this case, ‘desired end’ is referent to the research 
outcome, which along with the chosen research question, will be further elaborated on 
later in this chapter. In addition to this, the other important elements in the 
methodological framework of this study such as the chosen form of analysis, the data that 
will be analyzed, and the case study will all be introduced throughout the remainder of 
this chapter. 
 
3.1 Discourse Analysis 
 The primary type of analysis that has been chosen for this research study is 
discourse analysis. Obviously, in stating that this type of methodological analysis will be 
used, there becomes a requirement to not only briefly examine the essence of the 
discourse analysis in general, but also to refer to the research objectives in order to justify 
the selection of the discourse approach. As a first step in determining what analytical 
approach would be taken, it was extremely helpful to assess which approaches are 
associated with studies based in the securitization theoretical framework. In fact, there is 
an inherent association between ‘discourse’ and ‘security’. Buzan et al. express this 
sentiment in the Security: A New Framework text by stating, “The way to study 
securitization is to study discourse and political constellations”56 and thus securitization 
is reliant on the discursive construction surrounding whatever particular issue is in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Buzan	  et	  al.	  Security:	  1998.	  p.	  25	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question. Consequently, the meaning of the term discourse, as well as the functionality of 
discourse analysis as a whole must be examined more closely. 
 Much of the theoretical underpinnings of the methodological framework in this 
research study will be derived from the work done by Copenhagen School researchers, 
Ole Waever and Lene Hansen’s work on discourse analysis put forth in their text, 
European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic States. Waever 
and Hansen first note that their understanding of discourse is a derivative of perspectives 
from Foucault, Laclau, and Mouffe57 in what they describe as an “early postructuralis[t]” 
perspective.58 Within the text, it is also explained that Waever and Hansen’s provided 
understandings of discourse was developed with deference to Jacques Derrida’s work on 
the discussion of the inherent meaning of language.59 How these previous works were 
adopted into Waever and Hansen’s understanding of discourse will be expounded upon 
later, as it is beneficial to first begin with an excerpt from the text in which the two 
authors offer their definitive view of the essence of discourse. 
 
“Discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the 
actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans. Especially for the study of foreign policy where much 
is hidden, it becomes a huge methodological advantage – and one inherent in the approach – that 
one stays at the level of discourse. If one sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic of the 
argument remains much more clear – one works on public, open sources and uses them for what 
they are, not as indicators of something else. What interests us is neither what individual decision 
makers really believe, nor what are shared beliefs among a population (although the latter comes 
closer), but what codes are used when actors relate to each other.”60 
 
 Briefly, as a point of criticism on the above quote from Hansen and Weaver, the 
use of “advantage” as a descriptive of this type of methodological framework should be 
addressed in order to give a frame of reference for the position of myself as an author on 
this perception. It is rather difficult to view the discursive methodological framework as 
an advantageous approach due to its insistence on not focusing on the rhetorical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  See	  Foucault:	  1972,	  Laclau	  &	  Mouffe:	  1985	  58	  Hansen, Lene, and Ole Waever. European Integration and National Identity the Challenge of the Nordic 
States: 2003. p.	  23 59	  Ibid.	  p.	  23	  60	  Ibid.	  p.	  26-­‐27	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connotations within the text. The distinctions of the methodologies are merely just two 
separate approaches and thus will not be viewed within some sort of a hierarchical 
framework wherein some methodological approaches provide researchers with a more 
enriched analytical perspective.   
As a researcher it is vital to draw a line that separates the concept of discourse 
from that of rhetoric. In placing one’s self in a position wherein discourse is chosen as the 
method for analysis in a study, the researcher must understand that the point is not to 
explore the intended meaning of what is being analyzed. Rather, the conscious approach 
of  “sticking to discourse as discourse”, or specifically looking at the framework that has 
shaped how things are discussed, is the focus of discourse analysis, and what separates it 
from the act of assessing rhetoric and the underlying attribution of meaning.61 When 
considering the different types of speech acts that were discussed in the theory chapter, 
the differentiation made in discourse analysis is made between assessing the locutionary 
act rather than the perlocutionary act.  
Perhaps another way in highlighting the discourse approach of this thesis would 
be to borrow from Foucault’s explanation of discourse from The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. As previously mentioned, Waever and Hansen base much of their viewpoints 
on this particular work. They assert that rather than discourse acting as a form of 
interpretation after the fact, it acts “as a system for the formulation of statements”62 and 
that the rules that govern within the system must be analyzed in connection with 
statements that are being made in the public discourse, and additionally discourse is 
essentially the formulation of linked objects within structured relationship.63 Foucault 
approaches a summation of these ideas by offering a definition of discourse in saying, 
“We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same 
discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity … it is made up of a 
limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be 
defined.”64 
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  Ibid.	  p.	  27	  62	  Ibid.	  p.	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  Foucault,	  Michel.	  The	  Archaeology	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  Knowledge:	  1972.	  p.	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  Ibid.	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 In the case of language, and its association with discourse analysis, the 
aforementioned work by Derrida, Laclau, and Mouffe will be referenced again. The 
biggest point of emphasis to be made is the distinction of language’s place within the act 
of analysis. One has, for instance, the option to view language from the referential point 
of view wherein the objects in one’s environment are signified through language in order 
to be identified. As a means of discourse analysis, Waever and Hansen reject the use of a 
referential view of language due to the psychological connotations it has by association 
with terms like “’perceptions’ or ‘belief systems’ or ‘images’ in Foreign Policy 
Analysis”65 and ultimately commits the researcher to an analytic level of accessing 
implied meaning and the thought processes made by the author. The alternative to this 
line of thinking lies in the differential understanding of language in which meaning 
becomes a derivative from the differentiation between concepts.66 Herein lies the 
connection between the previous delineation of discourse and the differential 
understanding of language. The production of statements forms a system of discourse, 
and from the system of discourse, the researcher must approach the act of analysis from a 
frame of reference that allows the researcher to “explain meaning and intelligibility as a 
function of the text, rather than conversely.”67 
 
3.2 Research Objective 
 In his article, Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of 
Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War, Adam Liff offers an excellent quote that 
partially aids in legitimizing the thematic selection of cyber conflict for this research 
study: 
 
“Despite its increasing salience to policymakers and defense planners, the issue of cyberwarfare has 
not caught the attention of most students of international relations. Much of the limited existing 
literature has emerged from US war colleges, policy-oriented research institutions, and think tanks 
and is often under-theorized.”68 	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Though the use of the term, ‘cyberwarfare’ is a small controversy in itself, and my 
personal stance on this issue as a researcher going forward will be explored later in this 
chapter, Liff raises an important issue by pointing out the glaring gap in the theorization 
relating to the topic of cyber conflict. Not only is it a beneficial contribution for the world 
of academia to continuously work towards getting in front of this topic and trying to fill 
the massive research gaps, but as a researcher in the field of Peace Research it is even 
more beneficial to look towards making contributions to this field of study from a 
perspective that is converse to the ones held by researchers from American war colleges, 
research institutions, and think tanks that Liff mentions. Peace researchers have so far 
under researched the cyber realm as a legitimate or important theater of conflict from 
which to envision a movement towards the construction of peace.69 
 The identification of gaps in theory and contemporary research is at the heart of 
the development process of a research objective. In regards to this topic, George and 
Bennett explain that the research objective “should be embedded in a well informed 
assessment that identifies gaps in the current state of knowledge, acknowledges 
contradictory theories, and notes inadequacies in the evidence for existing theories. In 
brief, the investigator needs to make the case that the proposed research will make a 
significant contribution to the field.”70 With that being said, this research study aims at 
addressing the massively under theorized concept of desecuritization as it relates to the 
topic of cyber conflict, particularly with the focus of the political discourse within 
Estonian policy documents. 
 
3.3 Selection of the Case 
 In terms of the selection of a case and its importance to a research study, or more 
specifically, its benefit to a research study is well summated by Michael Shapiro in his 
book Methods and Nations in the quote: “Conceptualizations (as opposed to 	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generalizations) are best developed in the context of specific historical episodes.”71 
Determining the case study that will be used in a research study is an important step in 
the overall design process. In general, the chosen case is an integral tool to aid in the 
facilitation of testing a hypothesis and maintaining the path originally laid out in the 
research objectives of the study. George and Bennett stress the importance of rather than 
selecting a case for the research plan based off of factors such as the author’s level of 
interest or the availability of source material, the author must accept that, “the primary 
criterion for the case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, 
whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes.”72 Thus, it 
is exceedingly vital for the case selection for this particular research study exhibits a high 
degree of relevance in relation to the topic of cyber conflict, as well as being an 
applicable case for the study of desecuritization. Accordingly, the remainder of this 
subsection will focus on the having a discussion on the process case selection for this 
research study as well as defending the relevance of the case in relation to the pre-
established research objective. 
 George and Bennett define a research case study as, “a well-defined aspect of a 
historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event 
itself.”73 In addition to this, the chosen historical event for the case study is considered to 
be “classes of events” that take place as part of the overall dynamic interaction over the 
course of time that the case study occurs.74 In this respect, choosing a case study for this 
research study requires a specific historical instance of dynamic interaction that remains 
pertinent to the topic of cyber conflict, while still serving as an event that can be used in 
the pursuit of applying and observing the concept of desecuritization. 
In a preliminary assessment of potential case studies on cyber conflict and 
security, researchers who study the topic of cyber conflict and cyber securitization will 
find copious mentions of the cyber attacks that occurred during April and May 2007 that 
targeted government, media, banking, and internet service provider websites in Estonia. 
As will be shown in more detail within Chapter 4 of this research study, officials both 	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within and outside of Estonia, as well as members of the media and academics have been 
quick to dub the barrage of cyber attacks on Estonia during the nearly month long period 
as the first instance of cyber warfare against a sovereign state. Though there have been 
more recent examples of cyber attacks causing significant damage to a state such as the 
Stuxnet attack on an Iranian nuclear facility, the Estonian case remains, at the time of 
writing, the most relevant case study for the examination of an instance in which nearly 
all security-related sectors came under direct attack from foreign entities for a prolonged 
period of time. The infancy of the cyber realm being considered as a potential vector for 
the advancement of military, economic, and political objectives considerably limits the 
pool of historical instances which can be drawn from as research case studies. As a result 
of this, researchers in this field are inherently handcuffed to this case study as a means to 
test different hypothesis related to cyber conflict. 
In the pursuit of maintaining consistency with the necessary elements for a case 
study listed above, it is important to note that the Estonian case exemplifies the classes of 
events that were previously mentioned as factors that must be included and addressed in 
the case study selection process. The dynamism of the interaction of different actors 
related to the Estonian attacks, especially the involvement of the Estonian governmental 
ministries combined with NATO involvement in the wake of the attacks will stand to be 
examined as a contextual exemplification of cyber conflict. Additionally, this case will 
also serve as a justifiable basis for the theoretical application and examination of the 
desecuritization concept. Finally, the elements that encompass the conceptualization of 
cyber peace building will be used in reference to the actions taken by both the Estonian 
ministries of government and the organ of NATO that was established as a response to 
the attacks that were committed against Estonia, now known as the Cyber Defense Center 
of Excellence (NATO CCDCOE). The following subsection will go into detail as far as 
elaborating on the formulation and collection of the data that will be used in conjunction 
with the case study. 
 
3.4 Data Selection (Inclusion / Exclusion) 
 Within any field of study, the process of formulating the data that will be used can 
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potentially be an arduous and heavily selective task. Careful work must be done to make 
sure that from the vast expanses of sources one can draw from, they are not only relevant 
to the chosen case, but also useful within the overall context of the research plan. These 
considerations were extremely important in the instance of choosing the data that would 
be included, as the discourse on cyber conflict extends globally and permeates disciplines 
other than just ones based in security studies or peace research. However, the case study 
that was selected for this research study significantly narrows the field of potential data 
that can be analyzed. As such, the following subsection will briefly reflect on the 
selection of the data, particularly covering the reasoning for the inclusion or exclusion of 
existing potential material. 
 There has been a wealth of information produced that addresses the aftermath of 
the Estonian cyber attacks in 2007. These data sources are in the form of news media 
coverage, policy documents produced by Estonian government ministries, manuals and 
reports produced by NATO’s CCDCOE, academic discourse, and discourse from the 
community of cyber security professionals. Though one choice could be to do an analysis 
of this data in order to gain a snapshot of the general response during a specific period of 
time following the attacks, this is potentially far too great of a task for the scope of a 
master’s thesis. Accordingly, the analysis chapter of this research study will solely 
address the documents produced by the Estonian government ministries and the NATO 
CCDCOE from the seven-year period between 2007-2014. In some instances like the 
Estonia Information Systems Authority (EISA), the production of concise annual reports 
on cyber security strategy only came about in 2012. Prior to this, EISA produced digital 
yearbooks covering a myriad of topics beyond just cyber security strategy. Because of 
this, these sources were intentionally excluded from the analysis.  
 With this being stated, the primary data that has been selected for this research 
study includes: 
o Cyber Security Strategy (2008 – 2013) [Estonian Ministry of Defense] 
o Cyber Security Strategy (2014 – 2017) [Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication] 
o Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyberwarfare [NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence] 
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o National Cyber Security Framework [NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center 
of Excellence] 
o 2012, 2013, 2014 Annual Report [Estonian Information Systems Authority] 
The information within these documents serves as the basis from which the theoretical 
framework discussed in the previous chapter will be used as a tool for the goal of 
assessing the existence or inexistence of desecuritization processes occurring in the wake 
of the cyber attacks. In this regard, the data analysis is meant to create a space for 
providing theoretical contributions regardless of whether the Estonian responses to the 
attacks exemplify processes of securitization or desecuritization.  
 
3.5 Limitations & Considerations  
The inclusion and exclusion of each of the above-mentioned sources was 
consciously made as a result of the necessary tie-in with the framework of Securitization 
Theory’s levels of analysis. As was stated in the previous chapter on theory, Buzan noted 
that the primary processes of securitization and desecuritization successfully occur on the 
‘units’ and ‘international subsystem’ levels of analysis. In this regard, the chosen sample 
data fits well with both the theoretical and methodological framework of this study in the 
ultimate pursuit of answering the research question. In spite of this general perception of 
cohesion within the research study, there are admittedly some instances in which there 
are limitations in the overall research design that must be taken into consideration prior to 
moving on to the chapters that cover the analysis and discussions of the primary data 
materials.  
Those with a background in the field of Peace Research may question the 
exclusion of peace-related theoretical underpinnings for this research study as it, in 
addition to a security-studies perspective, includes similar perspectives to that of 
Galtungian peace research. In response to this potential inquiry, the issue of scope and 
ambition for a master’s thesis should be quickly addressed. Merging two theoretical and 
epistemological foundations for a research study, as well as working towards a new 
theoretical contribution is far too ambitious for the small scope of this type of study. As 
such, these elements have been consciously omitted from both the theoretical basis of the 
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study as well as the research strategy. Such academic contributions will be later 
addressed in the concluding remarks as potential recommendations for future researchers 
working with this specific thematic research. 
One final point of consideration within this methods section is addressing the 
placement of this research study within the debate over the use of terminology 
concerning cyber conflict. In particular, this is in reference to the use of terminology that 
implicates various types of cyber actions as instances of cyber war. Though it will be 
stated early on that the intention is to place myself as a researcher within a perspective on 
this debate for the sake of coherent terminology usage throughout the remainder of the 
text. As such, it must me noted that rather than having the intention of focusing on further 
developing the terminological coherence within this field of study, the aim of presenting 
this debate is to curb possible misconceptions regarding the meaning that can later be 
derived from the analysis of ‘cyber conflict’ as opposed to ‘cyber warfare.’ 
 On one side of this argument you have a loosely related cohort of academics, 
military leaders, and governmental personnel who fall somewhere within a spectrum that 
extends from casual to incendiary usage of the term ‘cyber war’.75 The other side of the 
terminological debate is primarily composed of academics working to base actions in the 
cyber context within pre-existing understandings of terms like ‘attacks’, ‘conflict’, and 
‘war’ especially. The most notable of these academics whom shun the usage of the war 
simile is Thomas Rid, whose journal article, Cyber War Will Note Take Place stands as a 
compelling argumentative piece aimed at cautioning against the prevalence of attributing 
nefarious cyber actions as examples of warfare. Based in a perspective of war from the 
Clausewitizian definition of war, Rid breaks war down into three different necessary 
elements and attempts to make a connection to the known and theorized capacities of 
cyber attacks. The three elements listed in the text include: the inherent existence of 
violence in war, the instrumentality of war wherein force is the means by which the 
submittal of the defensive entity to the offensive entity is the end, and finally war, at its 
core, is transcendent of the perpetration of force as it serves as an extension of politics.76 
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With these three necessary elements established, Rid follows with the succinct expression 
that “there is no cyber offense that meets all three criteria.”77  
The biggest question left to answer then is, ‘why does the current 
conceptualization of cyber attack not meet the criteria to constitute actual instance of 
warfare?’. When it comes to the element of violence, the biggest detriment to the 
cyberwar argument is the lack of physical damage resulting from the attack, especially 
damage manifest as a body count as a result of the attack. Perhaps the most glaring factor 
in relation to the cyber war debate is that a cyber attack has yet to cause a human 
casualty. Though physical damage to a power plant was caused in the Iranian Stuxnet 
attacks (covered in chapter 4), this represents only one instance within a countless list of 
cyber attacks that have been committed.78 Additionally, on the topics of the 
instrumentality and political extension of warfare, the common theme of nebulous 
emanation of attack creates a problematic for the attribution of war terminology.  
The three biggest examples of cyber attack: Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and 
Iran (2010) are examples of attacks with relative ease of attribution to the attacking 
entity, but without any major entity actually taking credit for the attacks. The case for 
these attacks as extensions of political will is strong, but the instrumentality of these 
attacks is still quite weak. These major cyber attacks have remained just singular 
instances of aggression. There was no submittal by the defensive entity to the attacker, 
and the aggression ended as quickly as it began. So, to summate having assessed the 
parameters of war, and assessed their applicability to known cases that can be potentially 
seen as examples of cyber war, the use of this terminology within this research study will 
not be used on two accounts. First, being that neither of the arguments for and against the 
use of ‘cyber war’ are solidly grounded, there appears to be more work needed for a 
deeper conceptualization of the term before it can be used definitely in cyber discourse 
(an endeavor that will not be taken up within this study). Second, there is little benefit to 
the legitimacy of this study to refer to the case study of the Estonian attacks as war 
against the Estonian state when this claim is illegitimate in itself.  	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4.1 Cyber Infrastructure 
 
 Prior to discussing the topics of cyber infrastructure, cyber conflict, and cyber 
security, it is hepful to establish some fundamental understandings about the basic 
structure of the internet, what is meant by the term ‘cyber infrastructure’, and how cyber 
attacks are actually carried out. The first topic, cyber infrastructure, requires a brief 
synopsis of the initial formulation of the Internet and the development of its operational 
framework. From the establishment of the basic timeline of cyber infrastructural 
development, the key phraseology relating to cyber conflict as well as the technical 
pathology by which cyber attacks are perpetrated can be further elaborated on in order to 
provide a higher degree of coherence in the presentation of the case study on the cyber 
attacks against Estonia in 2007. 
 Understanding the structural framework of the Internet begins with the United 
States’ Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects’ Network (ARPANET) 
that was developed in 1959 as a communication network between four computers at 
University of California Los Angeles, Stanford University, University of California Santa 
Barbara, and University of Utah.79 ARPANET was based on the process of packet 
switching between computers in different locations in order to form a network for 
communication. Packet switching, in the most basic terms, is a process in which 
information is broken down into ‘packets’ that can be delivered across a network more 
quickly and easily than if the information is delivered in its whole form, and then the 
packets of information are subsequently reassembled into their original form upon arrival 
at the desired destination.80 
The network model originally created by ARPANET continued to grow in size 
over time from a closed singular network to the model similar to the Internet as it is 
known today in which there are numerous interconnected networks, and later adopted a 
set of standardizing design protocols known as “Transmission Control Protocol and 
Internet Protocol (TCP / IP)” in order to develop a more functional form of 
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communication within the networks.81 TCP/IP essentially functions as common language 
of the Internet that allows for computers within a network to communicate with one 
another regardless of differentiating operating systems, hardware, and software.82 The 
TCP/IP system is important not only due to the fact that it allowed for significantly 
increased levels of efficiency in information sharing within a network, but it also has 
greater implications in terms of the eventual commission of cyber attacks. Scott 
Shackelford asserts that because the TCP/IP system reconstructs packet sizes uniformly 
in order to allow any network to easily distribute them, this process consequently “[sets] 
the stage for cyber attackers masking attribution” as attacking users can easily employ 
different methods with the purpose of changing their apparent IP address to avoid 
attribution for the attack.83 Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail in the section 
outlining modes of cyber attack, certain cyber attacks like Denial of Service attacks, for 
example, target the IP address of a chosen website in order to cause it to be unable to be 
accessible to other users.  
 In the early days of the Internet’s development, IP addresses were the primary 
way in which an Internet destination was designated. IP addresses are commonly written 
out in a dotted decimal notation.84 For instance, the IP addresses associated with the 
University of Tampere at the time of writing are on a range of: 153.1.0.0 – 
153.1.255.255. However, for the vast majority of contemporary Internet users, the use of 
an IP address as a means of accessing an online destination has become irrelevant as a 
result of the development of the Domain Name System (DNS). Rather than a user 
looking to access the University of Tampere’s website via the specific IP address, the 
DNS allows for a simpler pathway for user access; in this case www.uta.fi is the specified 
domain name of the university’s website.  
 Internet infrastructure is entrenched within a system of code, and the way in 
which code is written facilitates how interactions occur online. Since the early 1990s the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has largely overseen the maintenance of the 
Internet’s structure and functionality. The IETF simply defines their mission by saying, 	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“The goal of the IETF is to make the Internet work better. The mission of the IETF is to 
produce high quality, relevant technical and engineering documents that influence the 
way people design, use, and manage the Internet in such a way as to make the Internet 
work better. These documents include protocol standards, best current practices, and 
informational documents of various kinds.”85 One example of the major contributions to 
the operational framework of the Internet made by the IETF is seen in their involvement 
with the development of the ‘text/html’ media format that a significant amount of the 
Internet is based in.86 On the subject of their involvement in the development of this pillar 
of web infrastructure, the IETF write, “HTML has been in use in the World Wide Web 
information infrastructure since 1990, and specified in various informal documents. The 
text/html media type was first officially defined by the IETF HTML working group in 
1995 in [HTML20].”87 The IETF is a representative example of how the Internet’s 
operational framework is in a perpetual state of flux and expansion. In the most basic 
summation, the core infrastructural backbone of the Internet is based in code that aims to 
facilitate communication within and amongst networks. 
 Finally, the connection between the topic of cyber infrastructure and that of the 
critical infrastructure of the state is an important one to be made. In the pursuit of 
defining what is meant by the term ‘critical infrastructure’ of the state, I refer to the 1997 
“Marsh Report” drafted by the Committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection for former 
United States President Bill Clinton regarding the necessity for the protection of critical 
infrastructure with respect to the United States continued electronic integration of state 
infrastructure. In this report, committee chairman Robert Marsh both defines critical 
infrastructure of the state, and then refers to its interconnection of cyber infrastructure by 
writing:  
 
“national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on the essential 
services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures—energy, banking and finance, 
transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications—must be viewed in a new context in 
the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications and computer 
systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. 	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This interlinkage has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an 
emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk.”88 
 
 Though the listed facets of critical infrastructure have always existed before the 
onset of the so-called “Information Age”, the networked cyber integration of these 
infrastructural sectors has opened up the possibility for nefarious action against a state, 
specifically with the possibility for existential threat to the state and its citizenry 
depending on the scale of the infrastructural breakdown, but now with the reality that 
such actions can be performed independently of location. The networked nature of these 
infrastructural sectors is essential to the potentiality for threat against human life as large-
scale breakdowns in one sector, like a power grid failure from a cyber attack, can lead to 
a “domino effect” in which multiple critical components of the state systematically break 
down and severely exacerbate the harmful effects of the cyber attack.89  
 
4.2 Modes of Cyber Attack 
 In order to fully understand the idea of cyber conflict, it is essential to receive a 
well-developed presentation of the various modes of attack that can be committed 
between cyber actors. One can simply refer to the existence of cyber attacks, but 
understanding how the different sectors of critical state infrastructure can be attacked and 
subsequently disabled requires some exemplification of attack methodology. In addition 
to the presentation of these attacking methodologies, it will be within this section that the 
terminological use of ‘war’ and ‘weaponry’ in relation to the cyber domain will be 
addressed. Terms like cyber war and cyber weapons are used significantly often in the 
discourse pertaining to the field, and thus require a brief mention for the purpose of 
distinguishing between what constitutes war, versus what constitutes and attack, as well 
as the general viability of using the term ‘cyber war’ at all in this study demands 
addressing. Also, the viability of labeling various modes of attack as examples of cyber 
weaponry that can be used against a state must be discussed prior to moving into an 
analysis of the Estonian case study. Accordingly, the following sub-section will be 	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organized so as to first list and define the attack methodologies, and subsequently survey 
the delineations between the different attack typologies. 
 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are easily the most important 
method of cyber attacks for this study to examine, as it was through the employment of 
DDoS attacks that the large majority of damage was done in the case study cyber attacks 
against Estonia in 2007. DDoS attacks manifest in various forms, as will be discussed 
further in the following introductions to flood attacks, and are the contemporaneously 
preferred method for cyber attacks. Shackelford points out that DDoS attacks are the 
most logical choice of cyber attacks due to the extreme ease of perpetration and cost 
efficiency when compared to more advanced types of attacks; DDoS attacks namely 
being particularly inexpensive with a high potential to inflict costly damage to a victim.90 
The way in which DDoS attacks work is that they overload targets with millions of 
connection requests (similar to a user refreshing a website thousands of times in a 
minute) in order to use up the servers allotted amount of bandwidth that would be able to 
handle the requests. The result of the sudden influx of connection requests is that service 
for all normal users is denied due to the inability of the server to cope with additional 
requests.  
The element of DDoS that designates it as ‘distributed’ is the incorporation of 
botnets to amplify the scale and damaging capacity of the attack. Botnets are simply a 
network of computers that can be taken control of to serve the purpose of a single 
attacker. The size of a botnet can vary greatly in size, and most importantly the users of 
the computers being used in the botnet are unaware of the existing software on their 
computer that allows for it to be controlled by another user. Botnets can be taken control 
of by various means. Computer security company Symantec has stated that criminally 
renting a botnet can cost “as little as $100-$200 per day.”91 In addition to the use of 
botnets, individuals can assist others in a DDoS attack on a voluntary basis through the 
use of an open source program like Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) wherein the user can 
select a targeted IP, and the program facilitates an influx of a large amount of “connect 	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requests” as a contribution to the other botnets concomitantly enlisted to attack the 
target.92 
 Another oft-employed method for cyber attackers is referred to as ‘flood attacks.’ 
Flood attacks are technically within a subcategory that also falls under the umbrella 
heading of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as they primarily operate as a means to 
overwhelm a target in order to render it unable to be accessed or used as it normally 
would. What differentiates these from that of DDoS attacks is that they are performed by 
single entities, and thus do not possess a distributed nature. Flood attacks can be broken 
down into two different methodologies: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and 
TCP SYN floods.93 ICMP floods (also referred to a ‘smurfing’) are a method for attack in 
which a targeted IP address is sent to an IP broadcast server, and from there numerous 
other IP addresses receive information packets from the targeted IP. The result of this 
broadcast is that the IPs receiving the information packets will reciprocate the attempted 
communication to the original source, but due to the large amount of foreign IPs 
participating in this reciprocation of packet distribution, the originally targeted IP 
becomes overwhelmed with a sudden influx of information. Due to the sudden influx of 
information the target will become bogged down in its operational capacity until the 
flood has subsided. 
TCP SYN floods differ greatly from ICMP floods in that rather than flooding an 
individual target directly, SYN floods work to overwhelm a server so that others can no 
longer access the server. The key to understanding how this type of attack works is to 
first understand the ‘Three-Way TCP Handshake’ (stylized as SYN > SYN-ACK > 
ACK).94 In attempting to make a TCP connection, a segment of information must first be 
sent to a server. This represents the SYN part of the handshake and is point at which this 
type of connection can be exploited in order to disable use of a server. The IETF clarifies 
how a flood of SYN requests can be exploited in explaining, “The goal is to send a quick 
barrage of SYN segments from IP addresses … that will not generate replies to the SYN-	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ACKs that are produced. By keeping the backlog full of bogus half-opened connections, 
legitimate requests will be rejected.”95  
 Though the aforementioned modes of attack have the potentiality for causing 
damaging effects on networked targets both in the public and private sector, a more 
recent and more destructive method of cyber attack has manifest itself as the so-called 
‘Zero-Day Exploits.’ According to Shackelford, zero-day attacks occur as a result of the 
discovery of a massive error in software yet to be known to the users or developers, 
which is then exploited in order to satisfy the goals of the attacker.96 One particular zero-
day attack that has garnered a significant amount of international attention is the Stuxnet 
infection. The Stuxnet infection was originally discovered in 2010 by Belarusian anti-
virus company Virusblokada as a piece of malware with an unknown purpose or 
destination. Throughout the summer of 2010 numerous other anti-virus and computer 
forensics teams around the world went to work in order to discover what the purpose of 
the infection was.  
 One of the central figures in the investigation of Stuxnet is Ralph Langer, who 
explained in a TED talk regarding the Stuxnet infection that his computer forensics team 
soon revealed that the infection was designed specifically to target the Natanz Fuel 
Enrichment Plant in Iran.97 From this revelation it was also revealed that Stuxnet 
specifically targeted the uranium enrichment centrifuges at the plant, causing them to 
operate at unsafe levels, while simultaneously working to intercept the data readouts at 
the enrichment plant and provide inaccurate data that indicated normal operation of the 
centrifuges.98 The Stuxnet infection proved to be a successful venture for the developers 
of its code as it infiltrated devices in the Natanz plant by taking advantage of four 
different zero-day exploits.99 For the Natanz plant, the Stuxnet infection resulted in 
having “wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though 
not destroy, Tehran’s ability to make its first nuclear arms” according to an article 
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chronicling the attacks in the New York Times.100 In this regard, Stuxnet was a turning 
point in the speculation surrounding the destructive capacity for cyber attacks as it 
resulted in physical damage to state infrastructure.  
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5.1 The Case: Estonia, 2007 
 
 In Tallinn, the capital city of Estonia, there stands a Soviet-era World War II 
memorial in the form of a bronze Red Army soldier. The bronze solider memorial serves 
as a commemoration of the fallen Soviet soldiers that died fighting the Nazis in the 
Estonian region. Following the Estonian attainment of independence, the monument was 
the source of a significant amount of ire and provocation for Estonians, as it was 
perceived to be representative of Soviet occupation and oppression that followed the end 
of the Second World War. As a result of the controversy that the bronze soldier drew, the 
Estonian government decided to move the memorial away from its original location, at 
Tõnismägi Park in the city center of Tallinn, to a new location within the Defense Forces’ 
Cemetery of Tallinn, which is located further away from the city center. The movement 
of the bronze solider is representative of the breaking point amongst those divided by 
ethnically Russian and Estonian perspectives on the meaning attributed to the soldier 
memorial. The actions taken by the Estonian government in April 2007 to remove the 
bronze soldier memorial had two subsequent results: tangible and non-tangible protest. In 
terms of tangible protest, the ethnically Russian Estonians held demonstrations in Tallinn 
to voice their displeasure with the decision to remove the memorial in which numerous 
protestors clashed with the Estonian authorities. The demonstrations occurred over April 
26th and 27th and with the protests taking on a violent turn, subsequently resulted in the 
arrests of 1,300 people, and another 100 injuries with one resulting in a fatality.101 
More importantly though, the protest against the Estonian government 
concomitantly manifest itself in the intangible sense through the employment of cyber 
attacks against various facets of critical Estonian cyber infrastructure. The cyber attacks 
were initiated immediately following the suppression of the street demonstrations on 
April 27th. The attacks initially began with relatively simplistic methods of ping flooding 
and DDoS attacks against various Estonian websites. Instructions on how to go about 
using these methods of attack were distributed on Russian-language online forums and 
Internet Relay Chatrooms (IRC) in order to allow less technologically advanced activists 
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to assist in the large-scale DDoS attacks against Estonian government websites.102 For 
some users, participation in the attacks was as simple as launching an executable .bat file 
that was distributed through the aforementioned communication channels.103 In one 
description of the extent of attacks on the government websites, Peter Finn of the 
Washington Post writes, “The Web sites of the Estonian president, the prime minister, 
Parliament and government ministries were quickly swamped with traffic, shutting them 
down. Hackers defaced other sites, putting, for instance, a Hitler mustache on the picture 
of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip on his political party's Web site.”104 Despite these initial 
successes on the part of the attackers, the CCDCOE described the first days of the attack 
as “simple, ineptly coordinated, and easily mitigated.”105  
 The cyber attacks continued to grow in scale and intensity over the following days 
as the attackers employed more advanced methods. April 30th marked the turning point in 
the cyber attacks wherein botnets were introduced as a mode of attack in order to sustain 
the large-scale DDoS attacks that had occurred over the previous two days. The Estonian 
minister of defense, Jaak Aaviksoo estimated the number of drone computers that 
encompassed the botnet used on April 30th was at least one million. The computers used 
in the botnet were located in states spanning the globe, including “The United States, 
China, Vietnam, Egypt, and Peru.”106 In the days following the end of the attacks, it was 
estimated by Arbor Networks that the total number of locations that housed computers 
used in the botnet attacks on Estonia to be about 178 different countries.107 The e-mail 
servers used by public officials were also targeted during the first few days of the attacks. 
The mode of attack in this instance was a mass distribution of spam e-mails, and in the 
case of the parliamentary members’ e-mail server, the inability to cope with the massive 
influx of usage caused there to be a twelve hour period in which the service was 
unavailable for members of parliament.108 	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Soon after the commencing days of the attack, the private communications sector 
began to experience the brunt of the effects of the botnet usage similarly to what was 
being felt by government-related websites. At this point, the targeted websites no longer 
included only government related domains, and had expanded to target Elion, Elisa, and 
Starman routers and domains to cause widespread service disruptions and loss of 
connectivity within Estonia, at one point resulting in a brief period of simultaneously 
complete service denial for all Elion users.109 The simultaneous targeting of the Estonian 
news media by the attackers further exacerbated the situation in Estonia. The CCDCOE 
claims that “three of Estonia’s six largest news organizations and news portals (including 
Postimees.ee, Delfi, EPL Online, Baltic News Service)” were significantly affected in 
their ability to keep their websites online during the attacks.110 With Estonia’s largest 
news publications being attacked at once, both people trying to access the websites 
through Estonian IP addresses, and those accessing from foreign IP addresses were 
continuously denied access to Estonian media reports on the progression of the attacks 
throughout multiple days of the attacks.  
The cyber attacks continued steadily from the night of April 27th to early hours of 
May 9th at which point the volume of incoming traffic ascended to its highest point of the 
multi-week barrage. The significance of the May 9th date is that it is the date in which 
Russia celebrates Victory Day in honor of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany’s forces 
in World War II, which is indicative of the poor timing chosen by the Estonian to remove 
the bronze soldier monument so closely to the holiday that also commemorates the Soviet 
soldiers involved in the fighting. Upon the arrival of 23:00 EET in Tallinn, or 00:00 MSK 
(Moscow time) on May 9th, the volume of incoming attacks on Estonian cyber 
infrastructure increased by 150% in comparison to previous days’ numbers.111 In addition 
to increased attacks on government websites, the arrival of the May 9th holiday also 
marked the incipience of attacks that specifically targeted the web-based economic 
infrastructure of Estonia. Two of the primary targets for the attackers were the largest 
banks in Estonia, Hansapank and SEB Eesti Ühispank, who own an estimated 75-80% of 
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the Estonian banking market share.112 Throughout the remainder of the attacks (the last 
official wave of attacks is May 18th, 2007 with a few sporadic disruptions following) the 
Estonian online banking services experienced numerous periods of denial of service 
attacks that resulted in the inability of bank customers to access their online banking 
services.  
In the wake of the Estonian cyber attacks, DDoS mitigation specialists and 
researchers, Arbor Networks ran an analysis of the DDoS attacks against Estonian 
websites from the April 27th onset until May 17th in order to quantitatively assess multiple 
aspects of the attacks. As far as the volume, type, and distribution of the attacks, Arbor 
Networks researcher Jose Nazario writes, “We’ve seen 128 unique DDoS attacks on 
Estonian websites in the past two weeks through ATLAS113. Of these, 115 were ICMP 
floods, 4 were TCP SYN floods, and 9 were generic traffic floods. Attacks were not 
distributed uniformly, with some sites seeing more attacks than others:114 
 
Attacks Destination Address or owner 
35 “195.80.105.107/32″ pol.ee 
7 “195.80.106.72/32″ www.riigikogu.ee 
36 “195.80.109.158/32″ www.riik.ee, www.peaminister.ee, www.valitsus.ee 
2 “195.80.124.53/32″ m53.envir.ee 
2 “213.184.49.171/32″ www.sm.ee 
6 “213.184.49.194/32″ www.agri.ee 
4 “213.184.50.6/32″ (Dept of Data & Communications) 
35 “213.184.50.69/32″ www.fin.ee (Ministry of Finance) 
1 “62.65.192.24/32″ (Starman ISP) 
 
[Source: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date/ 
(Accessed 11.3.15) Italicized text does not appear in the original publication.] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Ibid.	  p.	  22	  113	  Arbor	  network’s	  Active	  Threat	  Level	  Analysis	  System	  (ATLAS)	  is	  a	  free	  public	  portal	  made	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analyzing	  ongoing	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks	  and	  threat	  sources.	  (https://atlas.arbor.net/).	  114	  Nazario,	  Jose.	  "Estonian	  DDoS	  Attacks	  –	  A	  Summary	  to	  Date."	  Arbor	  Networks	  DDoS	  &	  Security	  Reports:	  The	  Arbor	  Networks	  IT	  Security	  Blog.	  May	  17,	  2007.	  
	  	  	   47 
 
The table presented by Arbor Networks clearly shows the distribution of attacks 
depending on what web locations were deemed by the attackers to be the primary targets. 
The targeted locations with at least thirty-five unique attacks represent the main 
governmental websites that include the website of the parliament and prime minister, as 
well as the websites for the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Data 
Communications, Estonian Informatics Center. In addition to the location data analysis 
done by Arbor networks, they also provide information regarding the length of time the 
unique attacks occurred for, as well as the size (measured in megabits per second and 
abbreviated as: ‘Mbps’) of the attacks.  
 
Attacks Length 
17 <1 minute 
78 1 min - 1 hour 
16 1 hour - 5 hours 
8 5 hours - 9 hours 
7 10 or more hours 
 
[Source: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date/ 
(Accessed 11.3.15)] 
 
 Arbor Networks’ numbers presented in the tables above are very revealing in 
terms of evidencing the technical capacity and goals of the attackers. Though the larger 
total numbers of attacks on the spectrum of short duration and low bandwidth size point 
to widespread involvement of less technically advanced attackers following the directives 
that were sent out over IRC and forum posts, it is the numbers on the larger end of the 
size and length spectrum of the attacks that are the most revealing. Arbor Networks 
mentions that an aggregate bandwidth of 100 Mbps for a cyber attack is the maximum 
size that is measured by ATLAS, and that ten of the attacks that fell into the ’70 Mbps – 
95 Mbps’ range registered at a size of 90 Mbps and additionally lasted at or near ten 
hours in total length of time.115 Thus, these attacks that are on the extreme end of the 
spectrum are emblematic of a contingent amongst the conglomerate of attackers that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Nazario.	  "Estonian	  DDoS	  Attacks	  –	  A	  Summary	  to	  Date."	  May	  17,	  2007.	  
Attacks Bandwidth Size 
42 Less than 10 Mbps 
52 10 Mbps - 30 Mbps 
22 30 Mbps - 70 Mbps 
12 70 Mbps - 95 Mbps 
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possessed both an elevated level of technological capability and direct intent to inflict a 
large amount of damage to the Estonian cyber infrastructure.   
The final step in the contextualization of the Estonian cyber attacks is to briefly 
cover the discourse relating the attribution of the perpetrators of the attacks. Due to the 
consideration of the factors of: the attacks occurring immediately following the 
movement of the bronze solider monument, the instructions for carrying out the attacks 
posted in Russian on Russian websites, and the May 9th attacks commencing at midnight 
in the Moscow time zone, the easy generalization is to assume that the attacks were 
committed by an unknown entity within Russia. Though no Estonian officials actually go 
as far as to assign blame directly to Russian citizens or the Russian government, there 
was still a high level of insinuation by some Estonian officials. The Estonian Prime 
Minister at the time of the attacks was quoted as saying, “the continuing cyber-attacks 
from the servers of Russian state authorities … indicates that our sovereign state is under 
a heavy attack."116 However, Merit Kopli, the editor of an Estonia newspaper targeted in 
the attacks was less diplomatic about assigning blame for the attacks by saying that there 
was “no question” that “the cyber attacks are from Russia.”117  
In the pursuit of identifying the origin of the attacks, IT professionals can 
sometimes rely on the IP addresses of the incoming attacks. In the Estonia attacks, many 
attacking IPs came from Russia, and as mentioned by the Estonian Prime Minister 
Ansip’s speech, some attacking IPs actually belonged to Russian government state 
institutions.118 However, it must be noted that using the incoming IPs is not always as 
reliable as it sounds because of the possibility for an attacker to mask their identity 
through a process known as ‘IP spoofing’ in which a user selects an alternative IP (ex. a 
known Russian governmental IP address) and conceals their identity during the attack 
while simultaneously leaving misleading digital footprints back to a user whom did not 
actually participate. In addition to this method, the employment of Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) similarly allows a user to be able to reroute their original IP address 
over a network, which then changes the user’s IP address to appear as though it is 	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actually from another country of origin. Hypothetically speaking, the IP addresses that 
appeared to have come from Russian sources may have actually been from another state, 
but the user was using a VPN to mask their origin. Thus, there is an extreme difficulty to 
immediately assign blame to a state or group within a state for a cyber attack until more 
work has been done in terms of forensics to make an attempt at unveiling the true origins 
of those committing cyber attacks. 
Mikko Hyppönen, a Finnish IT expert from the Helsinki-based computer security 
company F-Secure commented on the attacks alleged perpetration by Russian authorities 
by saying, "In practice there is just one IP address that leads to a government computer. It 
is of course possible that an attack was launched from there, too, but the person behind it 
could be anyone, from the son of some ministerial janitor upwards"119 and added that the 
Kremlin is more than technically capable to carry out more devastating attacks than what 
Estonia experienced during the month of attacks.120 Soon after the attacks, a further 
connection between Russia and the attacks was made when a leader within the Russian 
youth nationalist group, ‘Nashi’ named Konstantin Goloshokov took credit for 
participating in the attacks, as well as a Tallinn-based student named Dmitri 
Galushkevich.121 The latter of these two self-proclaimed attackers was later convicted in 
Estonia for taking part in the attacks. Though the general consensus in the years 
following the cyber attacks is that the perpetrators were primarily Russian-based 
politically motivated activists, there has been neither an official attribution of responsible 
persons, nor any large-scale prosecutions of persons involved in the cyber attacks. The 
lack of arrests for the attacks other than the singular case in Estonia is indicative of the 
overwhelming difficulty that exists for victimized governments have in attempting to 
locate the origins of attacks with certainty.  
 
5.2 Primary Data 
 The remainder of this chapter will reintroduce the primary data first mentioned in 
the methodology chapter, and subsequently provide an analysis and discussion of these 	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documents in relation to research objective. More concisely, the intention of this chapter 
is to serve as a place for the examination of the discourse emanating from post-cyber 
conflict Estonia, and a discussion regarding the existence or potential for desecuritization 
processes relating to cyber conflict. For the sake of organization, the documents will be 
introduced as two separate, but equally important categories. The first category will 
include the documents produced by the NATO CCDCOE, and the second will be cyber 
security-related documents that were published by the Estonian Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communication, Ministry of Defense, and the Information Systems 
Authority. Chronologically speaking, only the documents from the Information Systems 
Authority will be presented in the order they were published as these are annual reports, 
and are the only primary data that can be used to reference alterations in discourse over 
time. 
 
5.2.1 NATO CCDCOE 
 The first document to be analyzed is the National Cyber Security Framework 
Manual, edited by Alexander Klimburg, and published by the NATO CCDCOE in 2012. 
Firstly, the text is positioned by the authors in a way in which it is not meant to serve as 
document that suggests policy decisions for the members of NATO. Instead, it is a 
theoretically based interpretation of cyber security. Within the introduction of the 
document, Klimburg explains, “the ‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ does 
not strive to provide a single universally applicable checklist of things to consider when 
drafting a national cyber security strategy. Rather, it provides detailed background 
information and theoretical frameworks to help the reader understand the different facets 
of national cyber security, according to different levels of public policy formulation.”122 
In regards to the theoretical basis for the framework manual, the CCDCOE base 
themselves partly in a perspective derived from the Copenhagen School’s Securitization 
Theory.123 The large portion of Klimburg et al.’s theoretical viewpoint comes from their 
conceptual development of ‘National Cyber Security.’ As a result of the way in which 	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this text positions itself as offering somewhat of an analytical perspective on the 
operational nature of cyber security, it serves as a great starting point for the data analysis 
of which can be referred to in the comparison to the state documents from the Estonian 
ministries.  
 Klimburg et al.’s National Cyber Security (NCS) framework is a multi-layered 
approach to security analysis in which their levels of analysis (labeled ‘stake holders’ in 
their text) include private units, state governments, and international subsystems, and 
their sectoral analysis is broken down into military, political, economic, and societal 
relationships with cyber interaction.124 As such, the authors define NCS by stating the 
following: 
 
“‘The focused application of specific governmental levers and information assurance principles to 
public, private and relevant international ICT systems, and their associated content, where these 
systems directly pertain to national security.’” 125 
 
In addition to this, the understandings of national security and cyber security are explored 
in the text in order to further assess the definitive understanding of NCS. From a survey 
of the strategy documents produced by France, Britain, Germany, Canada, and Australia 
in 2008 Klimburg et al. claim that the political discourse surrounding the topic 
significantly blurs the line that separates the security focus of the national level with that 
of the international level, leading the authors to see a trend towards states understanding 
general cyber security and national cyber security analogously.126 The most important 
revelation to come from Klimburg analysis of NCS strategy was that the contemporary 
focus of the states that were surveyed in the year following the Estonian cyber attacks 
indicated that the primary goal has been to shore up domestic threat deterrence 
capabilities.127 This internally facing focus for state cyber strategy also indicates that 
there is little initiative being taken to better a state’s exploitative capacity in the 
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international theater.128 However, there are obvious cases in which this is not the case, 
particularly when it comes to the strategic foci of the major hegemonic powers.  
 Once the CCDCOE’s understanding of the term NCS has been established in the 
first section of the framework manual, Klimburg et al. move to elucidate their ‘Five 
Mandates of National Cyber Security.’ Though they chose to use “mandates”, this portion 
of their document is clearly reminiscent and influenced by the sectoral analysis that is 
presented in the Copenhagen School texts. The five mandates laid out by the CCDCOE 
include: ‘Military Cyber’, ‘Counter Cyber Crime’, ‘Intelligence and Counter 
Intelligence’, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection and national Crisis Management’, and 
‘Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance’.129 At this point, it is extremely beneficial to 
give a brief summation of these mandates in order to begin the process of establishing 
trends within the documents that have been chosen for analysis. 
 The Military Cyber mandate is referent to the development of state capacities 
within the cyber sector with the intention of developing offensive and defensive military 
actions. Though NATO admits that as many as 120 countries are looking into advancing 
their technical capabilities, should the perceived necessity for militaristic cyber actions 
arise, this is in regards to the incorporation of cyber actions into greater military action 
rather than solely waging war through cyber means.130 Similarly, the Intelligence and 
Counter-Intelligence mandate has strong ties to the military sector. Another name that is 
commonly associated with this mandate is ‘Cyber Espionage.’ In the most basic sense, 
cyber espionage is a tactic of unlawfully taking intellectual property, particularly 
intellectual property of the government and military. Though not referenced in this 
summated explanation of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence mandate within the 
NATO text, this cyber tactic has garnered more attention following the theft of United 
States military aircraft design plans through cyber espionage. In this regard, Klimburg et 
al. write, “Cyber espionage, when directed toward states, also makes it necessary to 
develop specific foreign policy response mechanisms capable of dealing with the inherent 
ambiguity of actor-nature in cyberspace.”131 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Ibid.	  p.	  28-­‐29	  129	  Ibid.	  p.	  32-­‐24	  130	  Ibid.	  p.	  32	  131	  Ibid.	  p.	  33	  
	  	  	   53 
 The Counter Cyber Crime mandate has a strong connection to the aforementioned 
Intelligence mandate in that both are positioned around the theft of intellectual 
property.132 However, this mandate has more to do with the economic and societal sectors 
of security analysis than with the military sector. Klimburg et al. admit that upon the 
preponderance of the discourse related to cyber criminal activity, the actions referenced 
in this mandate have yet to pose the same level of threat to conflict on a state versus state 
level, even shunning conventional association of terrorism with any past exemplifications 
of cyber criminal activity.133  
 As the meaning of critical cyber infrastructure has already been established, it is 
not necessary to preface Klimburg et al.’s mandate terminology in so far as discussing 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). However, National Crisis Management’s cyber 
tie-in requires slightly more explanation. Klimburg et al. cover this by saying, “National 
Crisis Management must be extended by an additional cyber component. This includes 
institutional structures which enhance the cooperation between state and non-state actors 
both nationally and internationally, as well as a stable crisis communication network and 
an applicable legal framework to exchange relevant information.”134 The development of 
a legal framework regarding cyber interaction is then built upon by the ‘Cyber 
Diplomacy’ and Internet Governance mandate. However, this mandate is much larger in 
scope than the previously mentioned mandate as it promotes the involvement of 
international actors like the UN to become more active in the facilitation of developing a 
better legal framework as well as international cyber governance mechanisms for the 
purpose of addressing the threats posed by the issues within the aforementioned 
mandates.  
Klimburg et al. provide the following table to provide an assessment of the level 
of national impact each of the different types of activity mentioned within the mandates 
have based on a scale of either “low” or “high” levels of impact: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Ibid.	  p.	  32	  133	  Ibid.	  p.	  32	  134	  Ibid.	  p.	  33	  
	  	  	   54 
 
(Source: Figure 3. Klimburg & Healey. “Strategic Goals and Stakeholders” in Nation Cyber Security 
Framework Manual. NATO CCDCOE: 2012, p. 78.) 
 
The facilitation of addressing the issues posed within the mandates of the 
framework manual is further elaborated on as such conceptualization has had little 
traction amongst international policy makers. Authors Luiijf and Healey describe the 
approach to addressing the five mandates as supplemental “cross-mandates.”135 These 
three separate cross mandates include (1) Coordination, (2) Information Exchange and 
Data Protection, and (3) Research and Education.136 The cross mandates proposed by 
Luiijf and Healey are indicative of a dual layer approach to addressing cyber security 
issues wherein the public and private sectors are needed to address their own separate but 
equally important steps towards threat reduction. This relationship is explained as one 
where the private sector is relied upon to make positive steps towards threat reduction 
(i.e. computer security firms), but in such cases where the private sector has failed to 
beneficial progress, the state becomes compelled to enact legislation and “regulatory 
frameworks” in order to alleviate the problem.137 As an alternative to this scenario, 
however, the authors explain that the reliance on “stick-and-carrot approach[es]” by 
liberal democracies for the development of a cyber governance framework exists as the 	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primary option.138 In this sense, the move towards securitization can be avoided through 
more emphasis being placed on the private sector working towards addressing the three 
cross mandates provided by Luiijf and Healey; as the incumbency for threat reduction 
lies in the successful development of deterrence and resiliency measures for computer 
security through the work of the private sector rather than the government. 
Of particular note within the text regarding the work towards eliminating the 
threat of cyber conflict is the importance that must be placed on the promotion of 
education regarding the operational understandings of cyber interaction. This emphasis 
falls under the heading of the third cross mandate, ‘Research and Education’, and authors 
Luiijf and Healey explain the importance of education by writing, “Cyber security at the 
national level will fail when there is an inappropriate level of cyber security awareness 
and education. A nation requires its ministry of education and/or science to develop 
strategic/operational programmes for cyber security awareness and education.”139 In 
addition to this sentiment, the text also emphasizes the need for an education initiative to 
target the general public, cyber security professionals, and the personnel of state 
governments equally.  
This would be a beneficial point to step back from presenting this first text in 
order to assess the mandates and cross mandates as they relate to the desecuritization 
concept, and its processual betiding that was discussed in chapter two of this research 
study. First, in regards to the cross mandate of Research and Education, this approach has 
a very strong impact on the successfulness or failure of a securitizing move. The initiative 
to further educate members of all facets of a society regarding the functionality of cyber 
interaction raises the awareness level of how to better ameliorate users’ deficiencies that 
may eventually lead to exploitations for nefarious purposes (i.e. the commission of a 
cyber attack.) 
Indeed, such an initiative is a positive step in considerably reducing the threat of 
cyber attacks and exploitation of lapses in user oversight in the future, but the initiative of 
this cross mandate also has the potentiality for drastically repositioning audiences in their 
reception to securitizing discourse. This relates to one of the questions brought up in the 	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Theoretical Chapter of this research study regarding potential instances in which an 
audience fails to reciprocate the feelings of necessity to securitize an issue presented by a 
securitizing elite. If one operates under the assumption that cyber conflict is an issue 
which has either been securitized as a whole, or is headed in a direction of becoming 
securitized by different securitizing entities internationally, then the way in which this 
cross mandate is framed in relation to securitization is altered. Rather, this becomes a 
question of whether this mandate has a connection to the desecuritization of the issue.  
To answer this quandary, perhaps it is beneficial to refer to the four different 
political manifestations of desecuritization. As a first point of reference, two of the 
political manifestations of desecuritization, replacement and silencing desecuritization, 
fail to accurately define the processes described in the cross mandates of the CCDCOE’s 
framework manual text. This is due to the fact that there is neither a new threat emanating 
as a derivative of the desecuritization of cyber threat to the state or international 
subsystem, nor has a threat source for cyber conflict been totally removed from the 
equation, as would be necessary for silencing. What is left is ‘change through 
stabilization’ and ‘rearticulation’. In reviewing the mandates of the text, it is apparent that 
these two political forms of desecuritization are applicable for different aspects and 
approaches deemed necessary for the alleviation of cyber conflict.  
The promotion of cyber governance principles, though not exactly what was 
envisioned by the Copenhagen School scholars when developing the conceptualization, is 
most closely associated with a change through stabilization approach to desecuritization. 
This assertion has the potentiality for developing into a larger discussion of the future of 
cyber governance building, and its relation to the connotation of state building that 
Hansen had raised as a problematic relating to change through stabilization. As for the 
proposed initiative for the promotion of research and education, this mandate is most 
closely related to the rearticulation process of desecuritization. This association is seen in 
the inherent implication that by shifting the way in which the incipience of cyber conflict 
is viewed, the threat eminence then becomes rearticulated. More specifically, by looking 
at cyber conflict as a result of lapses in deterrence and defense preparedness resulting 
from a lack of epistemic competence amongst all levels of a society, the view of outside 
threat to the state’s critical infrastructural security from unmitigated offensive capacities 
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becomes rearticulated in order to facilitate political resolution of an issue rather than a 
securitizing approach.  
The second of the two documents from the NATO CCDCOE that has been chosen 
for analysis in this research study is the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare. This document was published in 2013 as an amalgamation 
of the CCDCOE analysts’ work on the reconceptualization of international law and 
governance as a facet of resolving cyber conflict, or as they call it, ‘cyber warfare.’140 
This document will be analyzed in a similar manner to the previous NATO CCDCOE 
document wherein the major points of emphasis and clarifications of terminology / 
concepts will be covered, and the major additions to the overall discourse of cyber 
conflict resolution will be discussed and analyzed as far as their connection to the 
potential desecuritization of the issues that are addressed. The text itself defines the 
Tallinn Manual as “an expert-driven process designed to produce a non-binding 
document applying existing law to cyber warfare.”141 
For a contextualization of the sections of the text that work towards the 
reapplication of international law to cyber space, it makes sense to begin with a brief 
overview of the way in which the CCDCOE authors position themselves within the 
discourse of the subject in their introductory section. As a first point of emphasis in the 
Tallinn Manual, it is said that its overall aim is guided by the pursuit of addressing both 
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello as they relate to cyber conflict; concepts of which the 
authors of the Tallinn Manual notably felt were applicable to cyber conflict analysis 
unanimously.142 However the scope of the manual is not one that nefarious cyber actions 
like espionage / counter intelligence and cyber crime register in their understanding of 
war or conflict.143 In addition to this distinction, the manual continues by strictly avoiding 
any analysis of assessing the topic of “individual criminal liability” as it relates to cyber 
conflict.144 The final notable element of the Tallinn Manual’s contextualization is the 
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rejection of the use of security terminology in their research. This was done because the 
overall aim of the manual was intended to be written as purely an examination of 
international law applicability, and delving into the topic of cyber security is inherently a 
move in a completely different heuristic direction than was intended. 
Despite the conscious omission of a specifically security-related focus on the part 
of the manual’s authors, the initial section for analysis in the manual covers various state 
actions in cyber space and a progressive development of ‘International Cyber Security 
Law.’ The following excerpt addresses this section of the text, its purposes, and the 
ultimate research outcome. 
 
1. The term ‘international cyber security law’ is not a legal term of art. Rather, the object and 
purpose of its use here is to capture those aspects of general international law that relate to the 
hostile use of cyberspace, but are not formally an aspect of either the jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 
Hence, the term is only descriptive. It incorporates such legal concepts as sovereignty, jurisdiction, 
and State responsibility insofar as they relate to operation of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
 
2. In this regard, the International Group of Experts rejected any assertions that international law is 
silent on cyberspace in the sense that it is a new domain subject to international legal regulation only 
on the basis of new treaty law. On the contrary, the Experts unanimously concluded that general 
principles of international law applied to cyberspace.145 
 
From the establishment of the parameters espoused in the antecedent excerpt, the text 
moves toward a survey of the issue of state sovereignty as it applies to operations in 
cyber space. The issue of the critical cyber infrastructure of the state is strongly 
integrated into the development of the CCDCOE’s understanding of the constitution of 
state sovereignty.  
For the remainder of the analysis on this portion of the Tallinn Manual I will 
discuss the numerous proposed rules associated with the development of International 
Security Law. However, not all proposed rules will be discussed in detail, particularly the 
rules relating the “Conduct Hostilities” (Encompassing Rules 20-69, although Rule 20 
will be briefly discussed before moving on to non-NATO CCDCOE documents) as these 
issues have either been covered previously or are not pertinent to the thematic discussions 	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of this research study. The discussion of the proposed rules from the Tallinn Manual will 
thus begin with the affiliated rules that were prefaced by the introduction of the facets of 
International Cyber Security Law. 
 The proposed rule on sovereignty from this section of the text is thus, “A State 
may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and activities within its sovereign 
territory.”146 Broken down, this rule proposal is reliant on multiple underlying facets. 
These underlying facets include an established understanding of sovereignty over the 
state’s critical cyber infrastructure are based on where the cyber infrastructure is situated 
geographically. The terminological use of ‘geographic location’ is clarified in the text by 
saying that “the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea (including its bed and 
subsoil), archipelagic waters, or national airspace is subject to the sovereignty of the 
territorial State.”147 This also refers to cyber infrastructure possessed by private citizens 
or government entities, as it is all infrastructures that falls under the sovereign umbrella 
described in this rule of International Cyber Security Law. 
The second rule proposed in conjunction with International Cyber Security Law is 
that of ‘Jurisdiction.’ This rule is one that strongly ties back in with the case of the 
Estonian cyber attacks. This is because the Estonian attacks serve as a phenomenal case 
study in which one can actually theorize what the extent of the Estonian government’s 
jurisdiction was in terms of enforcing the its laws in response to the attacks that were 
committed against its cyber infrastructure. The Tallinn Manual addresses this quandary 
by offering the following analysis: “As to those acts which violated Estonian law, Estonia 
would, at a minimum, have been entitled to invoke jurisdiction over individuals, 
wherever located, who conducted the operations. In particular, its jurisdiction would have 
been justified because the operations had substantial effects on Estonian territory, such as 
interference with the banking system and governmental functions.”148 
Continuing with the topic of sovereignty and jurisdiction as it relates to cyber 
infrastructure, the third proposed rule from the Tallinn Manual addresses the problematic 
created by cyber infrastructure in non land-based locations. This, for instance, refers to 
cyber infrastructure based within international waters, international airspace, and outer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Ibid.	  p.	  25	  147	  Ibid.	  p.	  25	  148	  Ibid.	  p.	  28	  
	  	  	   60 
space. In this respect, the authors of the Tallinn Manual alleviate the potential ambiguity 
of jurisdiction over instances in which infrastructure in these locations is attacked by 
offering the solution of: “Cyber infrastructure located on aircraft, ships, or other 
platforms in international airspace, on the high seas, or in outer space is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the flag State or State of registration.”149 While this clarification does not 
directly link to the Estonian case study, it is a distinction and provision that will be 
beneficial for future developing theorization on governance practices and norms as they 
relate to cyber governance and consequent conflict resolution. 
With the above-mentioned distinctions in place, the Tallinn Manual thus moves to 
address the applicability of international law. The initial task in doing this is delving into 
state responsibility in instances in which a cyber attack on a state’s critical cyber 
infrastructure occurred as a result of another state’s sponsorship of this action. This topic 
is covered by proposed Rules 6, 7, and 8 of the Tallinn Manual. Respectively, these 
proposed rules are as follows: 
RULE 6 – Legal Responsibility of States 
A State bears international legal responsibility for a cyber operation attributable to it and which 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation.150 
RULE 7 – Cyber Operations Launched from Governmental Cyber Infrastructure 
The mere fact that a cyber operation has been launched or otherwise originates from governmental 
cyber infrastructure is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State but is an 
indication that the State in question is associated with the operation.151 
RULE 8 – Cyber Operations Routed Through a State 
The fact that a cyber operation has been routed via the cyber infrastructure located in a State is not 
sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State.152 
In keeping with the theme of referring back to the Estonian case as an exemplification in 
which one can reflect on the rule proposals of the Tallinn Manual, the issue of assigning 
blame for a cyber attack to one country (in the Estonian case it was Russia) becomes 
extremely problematic when taking VPNs into account. As was explained chapter 5.1, IP 
addresses of the attacking entities have multiple ways in which their owners can obscure 
them. Rule 8 makes reference to this problem by saying that just because the attack 	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appears to have emanated from one state does not immediately point to that state’s 
responsibility for the attack.  
Consequently, the instances mentioned in Rules 6 and 7 are extremely difficult to 
enforce, especially when considering that in the Estonian example there were attackers 
involved that intentionally spoofed their IP in order to make it appear as though the attack 
was coming from the Russian government’s cyber infrastructure, when this was not 
necessarily the case. From an analytical standpoint, this difficulty in the feasibility of the 
proposed rules begs the question of what can be done to overcome inabilities in 
attributing attack origin that undermine the ability of the international community to 
assign legal responsibility for attacks that may be committed against a state’s cyber 
infrastructure. Legally speaking, this is a very difficult question to answer. However, the 
alleviation of the complication that stems from attack source ambiguity has potentiality in 
the aforementioned mandate for increased initiatives for research and education in the 
computer security sector. Advanced capabilities in computer forensics coupled with more 
defined codification of cyber conflict law would simultaneously erode the attribution 
problematic as more development is made in these areas.   
 The final proposed rule from the Tallinn Manual for analysis is RULE 20 – 
Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict. This rule is framed within the manual by the 
following statement: “Cyber operations executed in the context of an armed conflict are 
subject to the law of armed conflict.”153 As was stated when this document was 
introduced in this chapter, Rule 20 is set within a portion of the text that deals the 
theorization of law on armed conflict and conduct in conflict situations as they relate to 
cyber conflict, and thus much of this section is consciously omitted from the discussion 
in the analysis sections. Despite this, this rule was chosen for inclusion due to its 
connection with the Estonian cyber attacks as a point of reference. As such, the sub-rules 
written in conjunction with Rule 20 explain, “in 2007 Estonia was the target of persistent 
cyber operations. However, the law of armed conflict did not apply to those cyber 
operations because the situation did not rise to the level of an armed conflict. By contrast, 
the law of armed conflict governed the cyber operations that occurred during the 
international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 because they were 	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undertaken in furtherance of that conflict.”154 This statement indicates that cyber conflict 
in and of itself does not constitute an instance of armed conflict, but with keeping in mind 
the terminological connections cyber conflict discourse has made to things like cyber 
weaponry and arms, this is a highly relevant argument against this standpoint. As it is 
framed here, cyber conflict only has the potentiality for a categorization as a tool within 
the framework of a greater armed conflict or a self contained instance of non-armed 
conflict.  
 Upon the assessment of this document, the findings as they relate to the existence 
of securitization or desecuritization movement lie primarily within the policy proposals 
for more developed international legislation on cyber conflict. Establishing a more robust 
framework for international law regarding cyber conflict opens up the space within the 
political realm for policy makers to address the issue of cyber conflict. As securitization 
moves the issue of cyber conflict into the exceptional status that is removed from the sort 
of legislative framework that aims at addressing such issues there is a potentiality for 
ameliorating perceived cyber threat through political means rather than securitizing 
means. However, this is not to say that what was included in the CCDCOE documents 
directly indicates a movement of desecuritization due to the fact that expanded political 
capacity to address cyber conflict does not necessarily result in a cessation of 
securitization by policy makers. 
 
5.2.2 Estonian Ministerial Public Documents 
 At this point, the analysis will move from looking at major documents from the 
NATO CCDCOE and now focus on the discourse developed from the public documents 
that were published by various ministries within the Estonia government following the 
cyber attacks. Again, the selected documents are: the Estonian Ministry of Defense’s 
Cyber Security Strategy for 2008, EISA’s Summary on Ensuring Cyber Security in 2012, 
the subsequent 2013 and 2014 EISA Annual Reports on Cyber Security, and the Estonian 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication’s Cyber Security Strategy for 2014-
2017. Accordingly, the documents will be introduced in their chronological order of 	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publication so that not only can the general discourse created by these documents be 
established, but also any potential variations in the policy over the course of publication 
dates can be noted as well. Contextually speaking, these documents do far more to create 
a sense of the Estonian governmental discourse on cyber threat mitigation than the 
CCDCOE documents, and thus they provide a perspective from a lower level of analysis 
from the international subsystem level to the state level. It should also be noted that 
general trend in Estonia’s cyber discourse is that of a securitizing movement, especially 
over the progression time between 2008 and 2014. This sentiment will be reflected on 
more thoroughly during the assessment of the final strategy document for 2014-2017. In 
spite of this trend, the overall goal is still to highlight trends in the discourse that hold the 
potentiality for desecuritization. 
 With documents and their order of analysis having been established, the first 
document that will be examined is the Estonian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Cyber 
Security Strategy for 2008 (henceforth referred to as ‘2008 CSS’). As the oldest of the 
chosen documents in this analysis category, the 2008 CSS document allows for the 
discourse to be framed from a perspective in which the initial publication of strategy 
mandates following the 2007 cyber attacks serves as a reference point from which to 
ultimately observe any trends or changes in the other Estonian documents as time 
progresses. From the outset of the document, the Estonian MoD identifies the 
“asymmetrical threat posed by cyber attacks and the inherent vulnerabilities of 
cyberspace” as the primary issue in which they seek to remedy through the execution of 
their strategy plan.155 In addition to this, the document also goes on to explain what the 
MoD envisions as potentially the best overall type of approach to alleviating cyber threat. 
As a first point of emphasis, the asymmetric cyber threat is viewed by the MoD as an 
issue that must be “addressed at the global level”, but also that states like Estonia have a 
responsibility to identify potential vulnerabilities in their cyber infrastructure and draft 
policies to address these vulnerabilities accordingly, both domestically and through 
international cooperation.156 
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 The 2008 CSS then goes on to discuss the domestic and international dimensions 
of threat deterrence, and specifically goes into what areas of focus these approaches 
should have. The Estonian MoD put forth four different “policy fronts” that they identify 
as areas in which the Estonian state would stand to make great strides in the future 
deterrence of cyber threat. The indentified policy fronts from the text are as follows: 
• application of a graduated system of security measures in Estonia;  
• development of Estonia’s expertise in and high awareness of information security to the 
highest standard of excellence;  
• development of an appropriate regulatory and legal framework to support the secure and 
seamless operability of information systems;  
• promoting international co-operation aimed at strengthening global cyber security. 
 Accordingly, the identification of these policy fronts is subsequently succeeded 
by an extended list of policy recommendations that specifically target each of these 
policy fronts. These policy recommendations provide great insight into the initial 
direction the Estonian government envisioned for altering the vulnerabilities of their 
cyber infrastructure.  The first of these policy recommendations is, in short, creating a 
push to enhance the technical robustness of Estonian computer security as it specifically 
relates to the resilience of the state’s critical cyber infrastructure. The sub-
recommendations within this general recommendation mentions the need for “enhancing” 
or “ensuring” cyber security through the concomitant bolstering of internet security.157 
What is necessary here is to delineate between understandings of security, especially if 
one views this policy recommendation as a move towards securitization in the 
Copenhagen sense of the word in order to facilitate the preparedness of infrastructure 
against cyber threat.  
However, the intention is not to uncover the intended meaning of the document 
authors, but rather to acknowledge identifiers in the text as to the direction of the policies. 
In this case, the enhancement of infrastructural resilience is associated with an 
enhancement of technical capabilities to ensure security, rather than the enhancement of 
the state’s ability to enact legislation to ensure infrastructural security. This assessment is 
derived from the technical nature of the sub-recommendations, specifically the inclusion 	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of the following: “The security of the Internet is vital to ensuring cyber security, since 
most of cyberspace is Internet-based. The main priorities in this respect are: 
strengthening the infrastructure of the Internet, including domain name servers“ ; “to 
improve on an incessant basis the capacity to meet the emergence of newer and 
technologically more advanced assault methods” ; “to enhance inter-agency co-operation 
and co-ordination in ensuring cyber security and to continue public and private sector co-
operation in protecting the critical information infrastructure.” These initiatives are 
completely rooted in the promotion of enhanced technical capacity for both the 
government and private sector, and in the case of the last point, an enhanced level of 
inter-agency communicative capacity.  
The next policy recommendation is entitled, “Increasing competence in Cyber 
Security.”158 This is along the same lines as the mandate from the NATO CCDCOE 
document that alluded to the necessitation of heavily increasing education and research 
relating to cyber competency. Similarly to the CCDCOE document, the MoD 2008 CSS 
document heavily stresses the point that the research and education initiative in tended 
for both the public and private sectors in order for its optimal efficacy. The specific 
objectives in this document include research and development for an higher level of 
training for IT staff in both sectors, as well as technical research and development for 
further advancement in personnel capabilities in both managing and preventing any 
attacks against cyber infrastructure.  
However, contrary to the CCDCOE document, the 2008 CSS separates the 
general public from the initiative for the promotion of cyber-related research and 
development. The inclusion of the general Estonian public in this equation is discussed as 
the potential policy for “Raising Awareness on Cyber Security.”159 This policy 
recommendation is explained as an initiative for the purpose of “Raising public 
awareness on the nature and urgency of the cyber threats.”160 As was stated in the 
previous sub-chapter (5.2.1) on the CCDCOE documents, the promotion of public 
knowledge on cyber interaction across various sectors, the connection state infrastructure 
has to cyber interaction, and the nature of both cyber threat and cyber deterrence all 	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factor into the publics’ ability to understand cyber security better, and thus have the 
potentiality to be less accepting a move towards cyber securitization. In the pursuit of 
providing a means by which this can be achieved, the 2008 CCS offers the following 
initiatives: “raising awareness of information security among all computer users with 
particular focus on individual users and [Small & Medium Enterprises] SMEs by 
informing the public about threats existing in the cyberspace and improving knowledge 
on the safe use of computers” and “co-ordinating the distribution of information on cyber 
threats and organising the awareness campaigns in co-operation with the private 
sector.”161 
In a more direct and further assessment of the two previous policy proposals, the 
connection to the concept of desecuritization – specifically the desecuritization of threat 
from cyber conflict – stems from potentiality for the existential threat of cyber 
infrastructure of the state to fail to register as an issue that gains acceptance from the 
various facets of society. The move towards desecuritization in this regard is multifold, as 
both the epistemological authority of the securitizing elites is severely diminished 
through the advancement of the knowledge base of the private and public entities. 
Additionally, the technical proficiently of IT professionals in the public and private sector 
ultimately leads to further ability to respond to or prevent attacks of an asymmetric nature 
on the scale of what was seen in Estonia. In short, these factors lead to a cascading effect 
where the pre-existing epistemological lapses and technical ineptitudes of state citizenry 
that lead to threat being levied against the state begins to be mitigated over time. 
To conclude the analysis of the MoD’s 2008 CSS document, the final two policy 
recommendations will be introduced. These two, in a similar fashion to the two 
aforementioned policies, are interconnected due to their scale of implementation; in this 
case they are on the international level of analysis. As they are listed in the document, the 
two policy recommendations are: “Improvement of the legal framework for supporting 
cyber security” and “Bolstering international co-operation.”162 The former of these two 
does, indeed, refer to the domestic level of legislation in addition to the international level 
of implementing law for the curbing of cyber actions detrimental to the operability of 	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cyber infrastructure. In particular, the document lists the overall lack of development of 
both terminological agreement within the context of international legislative bodies as a 
major problem in need of being addressed; “Several terms, such as cyber war, cyber 
attack, cyber terrorism or critical information infrastructure, have not been defined 
clearly. Everywhere they are used, but their precise and intended meaning will vary 
depending on the context.”163 Once again, this initiative is in agreeance with the 
CCDCOE’s stance on terminological coherence in legislation. And in the context of 
desecuritization, the promotion of domestic and international legislative development as a 
whole, and in terms of cyber-related terminology brings the discourse away a drift 
towards securitization as a result of ambiguous pre-existing legislation, back to a realm in 
which the discourse on cyber conflict is grounded in a coherent and internationally 
agreed upon framework. In this case, still unresolved threat posed by threats in the cyber 
theater are able to be addressed without the issue being elevated to a specialized political 
status.  
Finally, the policy of ‘Bolstering International Co-operation’ operates as both an 
extension and a continuing development of the previous policy regarding the 
development of international and domestic legislation on cyber conflict. This is seen as 
an extension of the previous policy due to the sub recommendation that states that one of 
the ultimate goals is “promoting countries’ adopting of international conventions 
regulating cyber crime and cyber attacks, and making the content of such conventions 
known to the international public.”164 Again, this is a move towards the politicization of 
the issue of cyber conflict rather than a move towards securitization in that goals such as 
this promote not only further development of a legislative framework to deal with cyber 
attacks and conflict, but also promoting the mass distribution of this information to the 
public. In doing this, both Estonian and other states become more engaged in the active 
political process focusing on the resolution of an issue rather than allowing for the issue 
to be taken out of the political realm of discourse. 
In summation of the previous analysis on the 2008 CSS document, the three major 
findings have been the importance placed on the themes of: knowledge advancement 	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amongst computer professionals and the general public, increased emphasis on creating a 
more comprehensive legislative framework in both the international and domestic 
settings, and the promotion of international cooperation in addressing the mitigation of 
cyber threat. These points of emphasis for the future mitigation of cyber threat stand as 
themes that will permeate the remaining annual reports as well, and ultimately serve as 
the benchmark for what can be seen as the potentiality for avenues in which 
desecuritization manifests in relation to cyber conflict. 
The next document for analysis is EISA’s 2012 Summary on Ensuring Cyber 
Security. Apart from covering the main task and responsibilities of EISA, the document 
covers two main points. The first is the promotion of initiatives similar to the 2008 MoD 
CSS document, and the second is a summation of the cyber conflict-related events of the 
2012 calendar year. In this respect, the first topic covered within the documents is 
“Ensuring Security Through Enhanced Knowledge.”165 This points to a rising trend 
within the documents so far reviewed as far as their general consensus on the necessity 
for the advancement of knowledge trough education and training initiatives in Estonia. 
The document explains that over the course of 2012 this initiative was facilitated by the 
organization of “5 seminars, 1 conference, 1 information day, and 17 trainings,” In 
addition to this, EISA held a symposium in Estonia aimed at training IT professionals in 
both public and private positions in how to best mitigate the potentiality for cyber attacks, 
as well as coping with cyber attacks directed at critical cyber infrastructure.166 One 
particular added point of emphasis is that this initiative targets “resolving civil and 
military cyber crises.”167 The capability of responding and resolving crises that arise as a 
result of cyber attacks, in essence, diminishes the level of threat attribution that can be 
assigned to cyber conflict. Rhetorically speaking, the advancement in cyber crisis 
management amongst IT professionals limits the ability of potential securitizing actors to 
claim the existentialism of cyber infrastructure is at risk from cyber attacks.  
EISA’s 2012 Annual Summary covers the topic of cyber-related legislation 
similarly to the MoD 2008 CSS document, but in the case of EISA’s document, there had 	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been enough time elapsed between the publications of the documents that the specific 
legislation in Estonia could be discussed in more detail. The document explains that 
during 2012, EISA made proposals to the Estonian government regarding making 
changes to the Public Information Act, the Emergency Act, the Electronic 
Communications Act, and the State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States 
Act regarding the intention of “amending and changing regulations governing cyber 
security and its supervision.”168 More specifically, EISA sought and received from the 
Estonian government more regulation targeting the information security standards within 
Estonia. The realization of this initiative materialized as the creation of senior 
information security official (CISO) as a position required of Estonian authorities to 
appoint for the purpose of “ensuring security requirements for electronic systems relevant 
for the functioning of vital services” in the public sector.169 As a further aspiration of this 
plan, the goal of this document’s publication was to have this role extended into the 
private sector for businesses as well. This, in effect, bolstered the deterrence and coping 
capabilities of all levels of cyber infrastructure in Estonia.  
The last topic covered in this document is the promotion of cooperation both 
internally and internationally. As had been discussed before, the protection of cyber 
infrastructure does not fall into the hands of any one entity within a state. Rather, this 
obligation is distributed amongst different authorities depending their functional nature. 
When it comes to internal cooperation, EISA refers to the opening of communication 
amongst the different organs of government. On this topic, the document lists numerous 
agencies within the Estonian government that gather monthly under the facilitation of the 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Commission and the Computer Emergency 
Response Team for Estonia (CERT-EE) for the purpose of constant cross-agency 
information sharing.170 This same initiative was taken on a broader scale with EISA 
strengthening their communication between research institutions in France, Germany and 
the United States, which resulted in further training and information sharing regarding 
cyber-related crises.171  	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The document closes by stating that 2012 was seen as a “peaceful year in 
Estonian cyberspace.”172 Additionally, it goes on to restate the importance put on 
continued development of cooperation and communication especially for the 
development of better research and training for the handling of cyber conflict, as well as 
stressing the look forward to future years for more legislative response to continuing the 
administrative support that things like the creation of the CISO position had in 2012.173 In 
taking a step back from the document to again assess what was proposed with respect to 
the theoretical underpinnings of this research study, one issue that remains uncertain is 
the connection desecuritization, specifically the different delineations of desecuritization, 
have in this case. Particularly, a point should be made to assess the applicability of these 
delineations further than what has already been covered. As was stated in section 5.2.1, 
moves towards desecuritization such as ‘change through stabilization’ and ‘replacement’ 
have little to no applicability in what was discussed in this document. If the promotion of 
these initiatives is clearly not a continuation of securitization of an issue, what is left is 
desecuritization through ‘rearticulation.’ The trajectory of the cyber conflict issue is 
altered by actively offering both political and societal alternatives that seek to mitigate 
the threat posed by the issue.  This change points to a move towards a desecuritization of 
the issue by altering how Estonia has decided to provide new alternatives and solutions to 
preventing future cyber crisis.  
The next document is the subsequent EISA 2013 Annual Report. The 2013 
Annual Report begins its analysis in the same manner in which the 2012 Annual Report 
finished in that it comments on the status of peace in Estonia relating to the committal of 
cyber attacks. The document describes 2013 as “a relatively peaceful year as far as 
serious incident are concerned”, citing the fact that major cyber incidents had declined 
during the year when compared to the year prior.174 Though this was not completely 
indicative of a year permeated by peace on the cyber-front as the document continues on 
its assessment of the year by saying that there was still an existence of isolated cyber 
attacks. The attacks registered by EISA in 2013 consisted of “13 cases of DDoS attacks” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Ibid.	  p.	  5	  173	  Ibid.	  p.	  5	  174	  Vaks,	  Toomas.	  "2013	  Annual	  Report	  Cyber	  Security	  Branch	  of	  the	  Estonian	  Information	  System	  Authority."	  January	  1,	  2013.	  p.	  6	  
	  	  	   71 
and website defacements had increased in comparison to previous years, of which EISA 
documented “240 cases.”175 The extent of the analysis of the status of Estonia’s cyber 
incidents and attacks within the report is significantly more expansive than what was seen 
in the 2012 report as there are numerous more statistics to analyze as a result of the 2013 
Estonian government requirement for state institutions to report all instances of cyber 
incidents to EISA.176 
In a further analysis of the reported cyber incidents in 2013, the collected data on 
the incidents is broken down by the cause attributed to why the incident occurred. On this 
topic the document says, “As causes for the incidents, attacks and administrative errors 
were cited most often, followed by deficiencies in software and hardware.”177 This 
realization supports the notions made by NATO and EISA in their previous documents 
wherein they stress the urgency of importance being placed on the promotion of technical 
research and education in order to increase the level of capability amongst the user base. 
The connection that inadequate technical capability has to the continued perpetration of 
cyber attacks and incidents is a point that cannot be stressed enough. This is especially 
the case when looking at the promotion of education and user competence in cyber 
interaction as a contributing factor towards a desecuritization of cyber conflict.  
Due to the shift in the way in which cyber attacks were undertaken over the time 
between 2008 and the publication of this 2013 document, EISA, within the section on 
future policy recommendations, address the rise of defacement as a chosen method for 
attack. Again, this problem is largely tied to the lapses in technical competence of users, 
particularly web administrators’ lapses in taking advantage in developments in software 
that prevents the ability for users to with nefarious intentions to commit defacements. As 
a response to this, EISA cites the Estonian Internet Foundation’s (EIF) development of 
domain name security (DNSSEC) as a means to promote increased DNS security for 
administrators and ultimately severely limit the possibility of future defacements and 
continue the trend of decline in cyber attacks. 
The 2013 Annual Report thus concludes with the sentiments that the transition 
into the 2014 calendar year will require continued persistence in emphasizing to users in 	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the public and private sector the importance of continued development system 
administrative competency and adoption of advancements in software and hardware. 
With that being said, we will now move to the final annual report, EISA’s 2014 Annual 
Report. In a preliminary assessment of the documents contents, the 2014 calendar year 
proved to be a difficult year in the pursuit of deterring cyber conflict. In his introduction 
within the report, Toomas Vaks, the director of Cyber Security at EISA goes as far as to 
say that it “faced new challenges in 2014. The security situation deteriorated noticeably; 
[Estonia is] now operating in Europe, where a war is being fought.”178 This conflict, as 
Vaks asserts, had a connection to the deteriorating cyber security situation in Estonia 
during 2014 wherein there was a rise in the total number of DDoS attack and 
defacements against Estonian domains.179 
Similarly to the 2007 attacks on Estonia the reported attacks in 2014 saw a trend 
in the employment of DDoS attacks to specifically target the primary government-related 
websites of Estonia. However, the document explains the recent development in the use 
of DDoS attacks is that they no longer have been used to solely focus on government or 
economic based domains; they have now been expanded in their employment into other 
sectors.180 As such, a key focus of the policy recommendations of the 2014 annual report 
is on addressing the continued threat posed by unmitigated DDoS attacks against domains 
extended across all sectors of the Estonian state. In this case the proposed remedy is 
bolstering monitoring of web activity and traffic for indicators of possible DDoS 
inundation against critical domains in order to provide faster responses to such attacks.181 
In addition to the proposal to address the continued problems with DDoS attacks, EISA 
also takes up again the discussion of major lapses in the adoption of patched software, 
which results in subsequent security lapses in various public and private web domains. 
2014 proved to be increasingly difficult in this regard due to the emergence of 
Heartbleed182 and the discontinued support of Windows XP, leaving open and exposing 
numerous avenues for attack as a result of revealed vulnerabilities. These realizations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Vaks,	  Toomas.	  "2014	  Annual	  Report	  Cyber	  Security	  Branch	  Of	  the	  Estonian	  Information	  System	  Authority."	  January	  1,	  2014.	  p.	  4	  179	  Ibid.	  Inforgraphic,	  p.	  3	  180	  Ibid.	  p.	  7-­‐8	  181	  Ibid.	  p.	  8	  182	  Heartbleed	  is	  an	  exploitative	  security	  bug	  that	  exposes	  online	  data	  that	  was	  originally	  encrypted.	  
	  	  	   73 
support the previous annual reports insistence that a realistic threat is posed cyber 
infrastructure by easily preventable user errors. 
Very little changes occurred between the latter discussion within the 2014 annual 
report on “Cyber Risk Prevention” compared to what was espoused in the previous two 
year’s reports. The same themes occur again in the form of insistence on: Increased 
training and education, increasing public awareness of cyber threats, DNSSEC 
implementation, and the expansion of international cooperation.183 Being that there is 
little change in these proposed initiatives, there is not a need to re-hash a parallel 
assessment of them with respect to the theoretical framework of this research study. What 
is more relevant for analysis is the discussion of legislative developments in regards to 
cyber security. The 2014 Annual Report serves as a preface to the Estonian Cyber 
Security Strategy for 2014-2017. A document which the 2014 Annual Report explains as 
an exemplification of a shift in thinking on cyber security strategy to expand its scope in 
an international direction rather than having an inward focus on strategically working on 
cyber threat deterrence. 
With that being said, the Estonian Cyber Security Strategy for 2014-2017 that was 
published by the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication (henceforth 
referred to as ‘CSS 14-17’) is the final document that will be examined in this research 
study. The trend of the specific points of emphasis continues within this text, as the 
primarily challenges in which Estonia seeks to overcome during the period between 2014 
and 2017 are listed as, “shaping the legal framework, promoting international cooperation 
and communication, raising awareness, and ensuring specialist education as well as the 
development of technical solutions”184, all of which have been covered extensively in the 
previously examined documents.  
The contents of the document that are of more pertinence to a pursuit of 
examining security-related discourse are found in the list of the “Principles of Ensuring 
Cyber Security.” The principles are framed within the text as way of supporting the 
assertion that to ensure the aforementioned challenges are resolved, specifically through 
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policy recommendations that develop into a “modern legal framework” to mitigate the 
committal of cyber attacks. These principles are listed as follows:185 
 
1. Cyber security is an integral part of national security, it supports the functioning of the state 
and society, the competitiveness of the economy and innovation. 
2. Cyber security is guaranteed by respecting fundamental rights and freedoms as well as by 
protecting individual liberties, personal information, and identity. 
3. Cyber security is ensured on the basis of the principle of proportionality while taking into 
account existing and potential risks and resources. 
4. Cyber security is ensured in a coordinated manner through cooperation between the public-, 
private- and third sectors, taking into account the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
existing infrastructure and services in cyberspace. 
5. Cyber security starts with individual responsibility for safe use of ICT tools. 
6. A top priority in ensuring cyber security is anticipating as well as preventing potential threats 
and responding effectively to threats that materialize. 
7. Cyber security is supported by intensive and internationally competitive research and 
development. 
8. Cyber security is ensured via international cooperation with allies and partners. Through 
cooperation, Estonia promotes global cybersecurity and enhances its own competence. 
 
Without treading too far into a trajectory of connoting the underlying meaning of the 
above-listed principles’ rhetoric, there is an inherent link that the principles have to the 
status of state existentialism and cyber security. Particularly, there is an extension of this 
connection to existentialism across the different sectors of analysis within the 
Copenhagen School Theory. This extension is derived from the apparent link that cyber 
security has in protecting the economic system of the state, the freedoms of the societal 
sector, and the integrity of national sovereignty. In turn, the principles highlight the way 
in which the security of cyberspace and cyber operations directly affects the security of 
other sectors.  
 In terms of the integrity of the state and its connection to cyber security, a 
proposed sub goal within the CSS 14-17 addresses “Ensuring digital continuity of the 
state.”186 This is explained to be achieved through ensuring that “E-services, processes, 
and information systems (including digital registers of evidential value) that are essential 
for the digital continuity of the state … have mirror and backup alternatives. Virtual 
embassies will ensure the functioning of the state, regardless of Estonia's territorial 
integrity.”187 With these factors in mind, the process of securitization through the speech 	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act of establishing threat to the existence or operability of the state is largely evident 
within Estonia’s CSS 14-17. While there are elements of the document that align with 
what has already been discussed as paradigms indicative of desecuritizing patterns, the 
focus on the eminent threat to state security shows, at least for the contemporary strategy 
objectives, that the trend in the discourse is one marked by a continued securitization. 
 In terms of concluding remarks for this chapter, one caveat to the overall analysis 
on the discourse of the documents should be a discussion of the permeation of references 
to security terminology within all of the NATO and Estonian ministerial texts. Being that 
the act of speaking security is inherently a move towards a securitized status, there exists 
underlying difficulty with assessing the initiatives and recommendations within the 
documents as exemplifications of moves towards desecuritization. Rushing too quickly 
into pointing out that any possible moves towards desecuritization within the same text 
that discusses these initiatives as progress towards increasing the national security of 
Estonia is incredibly problematic. Obviously, it is not as black and white as making a 
sweeping statement as to whether the discourse tells us that there is clearly a 
securitization or desecuritization occurring. Securitization Theory is merely a tool for 
analysis – a methodology for research – in this case looking at public document discourse 
following the 2007 cyber attacks. There are much deeper dynamics that must be assessed 
than just looking at securitizing processes through a general survey of the discourse, as 
the necessity for audience reciprocity of an elite’s conveyance of existential threat factors 
in as well. This factor has been taken into great account, as one can reference the 
discussion of this topic in the chapter 2, and the issue of audience non-reciprocity by way 
of rearticulation was noted as a signifier of desecuritization throughout chapter 5’s 
analysis.  
 For the concluding remarks of this chapter, the primary question to answer is: 
What has this analysis uncovered? And specifically, answering what can be said about 
the signification or non-signification of any movement towards cyber desecuritization at 
this point is an essential addition to the concluding remarks as well. The analysis of the 
collective discourse generated from the chosen public policy documents lacks enough 
evidence to describe the overall directive of the discourse as moving the issue of cyber 
conflict in a desecuritizing direction. This is due to the permeation of discourse 
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continuously aimed at elucidating the existential threat facing referent objects within 
multiple sectors of analysis.  This was especially evident in the analysis of the CSS 14-17 
document in which the self vs. other dynamism was at its most invigorated status since 
the 2007 attacks with the realization that cyber attack occurrences had increased as an 
extension of non-cyber conflict in the European region. As such, the discourse of these 
public documents largely operates in a securitizing framework. 
 However, as was referenced numerous times throughout the analysis and 
discussion of the documents, the application of the theoretical conceptualization of 
descuritization (especially the delineations of the manifestations of desecuritization made 
by Hansen) to the discourse of the documents reveals exemplifications of how the issue 
of cyber conflict can be reframed so as to not attribute existential threat to a referent 
object. In this sense, the claim that desecuritization can be used as a legitimate frame of 
analysis for the study of cyber conflict is evident, but contemporary exemplifications of 
this are still sparse. Such examples of desecuritization within the documents lay only in 
the rearticulation of a threat and the subsequent politicization of the issue in order to 
mitigate the threat. Other such delineations of desecuritization were incompatible with 
the policy recommendations and initiatives found within the documents’ discourse. With 
these principle findings being said, the concluding sentiments of this research study will 
be further expounded upon within the conclusion chapter, as well as recommendations 
for future research based on the analysis and findings of this study. 
 Finally, a discussion relating to the possibility of bridging the gap between cyber 
securitization and the conceptualization of cyber peace serves as a potential starting point 
from which a future study of cyber conflict to focus. The initial connection between these 
two concepts is found in the 2012 and 2013 Annual Reports in which they discuss the 
level of peace within Estonian cyberspace for the year.  Little analysis is offered beyond 
just briefly assessing the perceived level of peace in the cyber theater of operation. In this 
respect, the measure of peace used in the documents is only the quantifiable assessment 
of the attacks that were measured and recorded during the given year. From the 
perspective of Peace Research, this stands as a gap in the frame of reference in which one 
can assess the concept of peace in cyber space. In short, the conceptualization of cyber 
space exists as paradigmatic shift within the greater academic study of cyber interaction 
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from a social sciences standpoint, particularly from a peace and conflict research 
perspective. The following chapter will contain the concluding remarks of this research 
study regarding securitization and desecuritization in Estonia’s political discourse 
surrounding cyber conflict, as well as take into consideration the questions raised by the 
perceived gaps in research on cyber desecuritization and the conceptualization of cyber 
peace. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 The seven-year period between 2007 and 2014 saw significant changes in the way 
in which the international community viewed the issue of the cyber capacity for conflict. 
Beginning with the 2007 Estonian attacks and continuing with attacks on Georgia in 
2008, the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran the occurrences high-profile attacks continue. More 
recently at the time of writing this thesis cyber attacks have been exemplified as 
extensions of greater conflicts in the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and 2014 Hong Kong 
protests.188 The emergence of new challenges like cyber conflict potentially represents a 
large threat to states, depending on the scale of the attack. In this regard, the security of 
the state and the existentialism of various referent objects within the military, economic, 
political, and societal sectors may be pushed forward by legislators in order to take 
effective action against the cyber threat, effectively securitizing the issue.  
 What has been done in this research study is looking beyond the securitizing 
movement of the cyber issue, and attempted to either evidence movements of 
desecuritization wherein the cyber issue is changed in its presentation to the audience so 
as to bring it back into the politicized realm of resolution, or if no exact examples of 
applying desecuritization can be directly referenced as applicable cases, at least promote 
a further conceptualization of desecuritization. Both such cases are discussed in the 
concluding remarks of the previous chapter in which the various initiatives and policy 
recommendations put forth operate in a similar vein to desecuritization through a 
rearticulative methodology on the part of the Estonian ministries and NATO. The main 
caveat for the findings regarding securitization and desecuritization in the analyzed 
documents is that the apparent trend in discourse is indicative of securitization rather than 
desecuritization of the cyber issue.  
 The apparent Securitization of the cyber issue in Estonia stems from the continued 
insistence of major imminent threat to the state’s ability to operate or even exist in some 
aspects, and the subsequent policy objectives that look to alleviate this issue. This of 
course, does not necessary indicate that exceptional measures are being taken by NATO 
or Estonia, but this directive element was most apparent within the final document that 	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laid the framework for the cyber security strategy for the Estonian state going forward 
from 2014 to 2017.  
The phrase ‘paradigmatic shift’ has been used in conjunction with the pursuit of 
studying cyber-related discourse through the lens of the desecuritization concept within 
this thesis. This has been in reference to the under-employed use of desecuritization as a 
guiding theoretical concept in research on cyber security and cyber conflict. 
Academically speaking, the contribution made by this research study lies in the initiative 
to further attempt to apply this concept to a case study based on cyber security strategy 
policy recommendations. It is understandable that there is still much work to do in 
shifting the security focus of this field of study, as the general study of cyber conflict is 
relatively a theoretical zygote.  
Hansen’s delineations of desecuritzation were a great step in this direction, but the 
application of these delineations do not have a clean application to the field of cyber 
conflict, and one of the primary research considerations that can be derived from this 
particular study is that attempts to further apply the concept to other case studies of post-
cyber conflict discourse and rhetoric must be made, and even if there are no 
contemporary examples of desecuritization in practice then there is still the possibility of 
proposing policy directives that lead towards deeper elucidations of actual delineations of 
cyber desecuritization. Furthermore, a proposal to come from the findings of this research 
study is the development of a new delineation of desecuritization, which can be more 
accurately used in conjunction with cyber security analysis. The realization that 
rearticulative desecuritization did not completely fit with what was observed in the 
analyzed documents leads to a opportunity for adopting the ‘proliferation of epistemic 
authority amongst the all levels of the international community’ as a new way of 
envisioning cyber desecuritization. This stems from the permeation of the promotion of 
cyber-related knowledge advancement throughout the analyzed documents as a 
substantial factor in the mitigation of perceived cyber threat in the future. 
  To return to the topic of developing the potentiality for the conceptualization of 
cyber peace, it must first be said that this too falls into the category of being generally 
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under researched.189 Perhaps one of the more important findings in this research study is 
the permeation of equating low levels of cyber attack instances in the EISA annual 
reports with quasi-measurable levels of peace in Estonian cyber space. This gives 
credence to the idea that cyber peace represents more than just a theoretical proposition 
without any basis. The future of this conceptualization is two-fold. First, the field of 
peace research stands to make significant contributions to this topic through the 
application of perspectives like Galtungian theory to the study of cyber interaction. For 
instance there are bigger questions to be asked of the cyber peace concept such as “What 
constitutes Cyber Peace building” and “How do you delineate between positive and 
negative cyber peace.” Questions such as these move the line of thinking in a direction 
that demands more of blanket statements claiming peaceful years in cyber space as seen 
in the aforementioned annual reports. 
 The second part of the future of cyber peace conceptualization is the potentiality 
for creating links between the initiatives and policies that result in the desecuritization of 
an issue and the elements ultimately representing moves towards cyber peace. As 
evidenced in the analysis of the Estonian documents, many of the initiatives that were 
associated with moves towards desecuritization of aspects of cyber conflict were aimed at 
attack deterrence. By moving the issue of cyber attacks back into the politicized spectrum 
in order to ultimately mitigate the employment of the current known methodology of 
cyber attacks, there may be a link to the creation of peace. In the political process of 
mitigating the persistence of cyber attacks to a point where attacks cease, has a state 
actually created a situation of peace? This is a question that has the potentiality for 
exploration after more work has been made in relation to the previously discussed 
recommendations for future research on conceptualizing cyber peace.  
 As with the tradition of academic research, this thesis uncovered more questions 
in its conclusion than it was able to effectively answer. This is a positive for fledging 
fields of study like cyber conflict / cyber security / cyber peace as more questions need to 
be asked in order for the development of our collective knowledge of the issue. Lack of 
technical computer-related knowledge cannot be used as an inhibition to apply new 	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concepts and theories to this field. If nothing else, this must be the main take-away from 
this thesis. The international community is working to better understand the nature of 
cyber interaction whether it be for positive or negative purposes. There is a vast wealth of 
pre-existing theories and methodologies already used to research other fields of study that 
can ultimately be re-applied to the cyber theater of operation, and in doing so, can 
formulate a new paradigm in which cyber-related research is conducted. 
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